Television Interview, ABC Insiders

SUBJECTS: Middle East Conflict, 2026 National Defence Strategy; 2026 Integrated Investment Program; Defence Spending; Australia-US relationship;

DAVID SPEERS, HOST: Richard Marles, welcome to the program.

RICHARD MARLES, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: Morning, David. How are you?

SPEERS: Before we get to the National Defence Strategy, Iran's closed the Strait again. It's demanding the US lift its blockade. What's your reaction to the latest developments there?

MARLES: Well, obviously that is a disappointing development overnight. Clearly, this is a situation which is in flux. We have a fragile ceasefire in place. I think what we need to see now is every diplomatic avenue being pursued to turn this temporary ceasefire into one that is permanent, to obviously open the Strait of Hormuz, to return the global fuel supply chain to normality, and to put events on a pathway to peace. That's certainly what's in Australia's interest. It's obviously what's in the world's interests. And that is really the direction that we need to see events take place now.

SPEERS: This blockade is now critical to what happens next. What is the Australian government's position? Do you support this blockade or not?

MARLES: You're referring to the US?

SPEERS: The US blockade of Iranian ports.

MARLES: Yeah, look, I mean, so Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz and America has reacted. I'm not about to second-guess America's reaction in the context of that. I think what America wants, as we all want, is ultimately to see the Strait of Hormuz open. That's what's critically important here, and for the global fuel supply chain to be returned to normality. What I would also say, though, is that freedom of navigation, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, is paramount. It's paramount to Australia's national interests, and it's really important that it apply in the Strait of Hormuz.

SPEERS: I understand all of that, but back to this question. I mean, we know the Australian government support of the US strikes on Iran at the start of this war. You're not willing to say whether you support this US blockade now?

MARLES: That's not what I've said. What I'm saying is I'm not going to second-guess the decisions that they're making. I mean, there is a situation —

SPEERS: So, do you support it or not?

MARLES: Well, there is a situation right now, David, where Iran has sought to block the Strait of Hormuz. That is what has happened. And I can understand the American reaction to that. Now, they are the ones who are in the midst of whatever negotiations are happening right now. And ultimately, what we want to see is the Strait of Hormuz open. And I know that that's what the United States wants, and I'm not about to second-guess their decisions in relation to this specific reaction, because it's a reaction to the fundamental decision that Iran has made to block the Strait of Hormuz.

SPEERS: Look, Australia has an E‑7 Wedgetail aircraft there helping defend Gulf states, the UAE in particular. It has an extraordinary capability when it comes to monitoring movement in the air and at sea. Is it also providing information to US forces?

MARLES: Well, we've made this clear from the outset. I mean, it is there at the request of the UAE to provide for the defence of the countries of the Gulf, but principally the UAE. It supplies its information to the Combined Air Operations Centre, which operates out of Qatar. The United States does participate in that, and that's important in terms of being able to coordinate the air defences of the countries of the Gulf and the UAE itself. It would be impossible to provide, or to usefully provide for the defence of the UAE without our E‑7 Wedgetail working with the CAOC, which is in Qatar. So, the United States is a part of that. That was always going to be the situation. But this is there for the defence of the Gulf countries.

SPEERS: But is this Australian aircraft also therefore assisting the US in its naval blockade operation?

MARLES: Well, I don't think it'd be right to characterise that. I mean, what this aircraft is there providing for is the defence of the Gulf countries. I mean, its capability, without going into detail I should not go into publicly, is about being able to provide visibility of threats, particularly those that become airborne, and coordinating those so that countries are able to deploy whatever defensive measures they have, which the UAE does have, to intercept whatever is coming in their direction. That is what this capability is optimised to do. That is actually a bit different to what one might do in respect of any particular operation in relation to the Strait of Hormuz. Now, you know, we are engaged in conversations with our partners, with the UK, with France, but also with the United States, about what the world might look like going forward. And we don't know that yet.

SPEERS: And I want to come to that. But just for clarity on what's happening right now, the US is getting information from this plane. You've said it's primarily for defending the Gulf states, but is it open to the United States to use what they're getting from this Australian aircraft as part of their blockade?

MARLES: We're talking about different things.

SPEERS: It's a yes or a no.

MARLES: It's not actually. It's definitely not a yes or no in terms of how military capability works. But really, the fundamental answer, David, is that what this capability is optimised to do is not really something that would be useful in terms of the US blockade.

SPEERS: So, it's not useful to them and not being used by them?

MARLES: Well, it's being used by the UAE. It has an ability to look at airborne threats, and it is being optimised to look at those threats as they are directed towards the states of the Gulf. So, we're not talking about ports in Iran, but the states of the Gulf, particularly the UAE. So, you know, that line of questioning actually just isn't relevant in the context of what this capability is doing. It is there, and its mission, from an Australian point of view, is there as a defensive mission for the states of the Gulf, and particularly the UAE. And that is the job that it's doing.

SPEERS: Donald Trump, as we saw the other day, has accused Australia of refusing to help even when the US asked for help. Is this what he's talking about? Help with the blockade in the Strait?

MARLES: Look, I mean, I can't give a running commentary on — I'm not going to give a running commentary on — what the President says. I can really only tell you what the situation is from Australia's perspective. We've not had a specific request in relation to contributing any particular assets to the operation in respect of the Strait of Hormuz.

SPEERS: Any sort of request, even? Not a specific one, but any sort of request. What has been discussed?

MARLES: Well, we actually have embedded ADF personnel in Central Command, which is the US theatre command of the US Armed Forces, which operates in the Middle East. So, we don't go to every meeting, but we have some visibility. We are clearly working with our counterparts in Europe, in the UK and in France. There is a lot of thought going on about what kind of operation there might be when circumstances allow. But that's the important phrase here. And we don't know yet what those circumstances are.

SPEERS: Sorry to interrupt. I guess I'm asking more about what the President's talking about right now, not what might come after the war. But has there been any sort of informal general discussion around can Australia help?

MARLES: Look, there has not been a specific request for any Australian capability. Obviously, we will help. The Strait of Hormuz matters to Australia. It matters that it's open, and it matters that we see the global fuel supply chain return to normal.

SPEERS: You keep talking about a specific request, Minister. Is there something less specific?

MARLES: Well, I'm not about to go into a whole lot of conversations that have happened, but what I am trying to give you, David, is Australia's posture here. We are working with the UK, with France, with all of our friends and partners, and that does include the United States, in respect of what the future might hold, and we are clearly going to help. But, you know, the nature of that help is something that I'm not going to speculate on because we can’t say right now.

SPEERS: Well, Donald Trump is, isn't he? Donald Trump keeps saying he's asked and Australia won't help. I mean, surely that must concern you because it goes to our alliance. And if he doesn't think we're willing to help when asked, where does it leave it?

MARLES: Well, I've articulated what Australia's posture is. I've said I'm not going to give a running commentary on the President's comments. And from there, ultimately it's a matter for the President to explain what he's saying. But, you know, we get the significance of the Strait of Hormuz. Obviously, we will help, but the nature of that is impossible to speculate upon, or at least I'm not going to speculate upon it when we don't know what the circumstances are going to be, other than to say we have a very significant platform which is currently in the region, which right now is being optimised for the defence of the states of the Gulf, and it is doing really important work there. We will continue with the conversations that are being had around what might be planned here in terms of those 49 nations that convened on Friday night. There is another meeting coming up this week which will have more of a defence focus. We will be there, but all of these conversations are based on what circumstances will allow, and none of us know that yet.

SPEERS: So, what's Australia willing to take to that meeting in London? What are we willing to put on the table? Would it be continuing the E-7 Wedgetail?

MARLES: I'm specifically not going to speculate on what may happen and what we might do. The Strait of Hormuz are relevant to Australia, highly relevant — they matter. We want to see them open. Obviously, we will help. It does not serve for me to speculate about a whole lot of scenarios when we don't know, and no one knows, what those circumstances will be. But we will be participating in these conversations along with these other countries, and we will work that through.

SPEERS: When did you last talk to your counterpart, Pete Hegseth, about all of this and Donald Trump keeping on attacking Australia? Is it worth having a chat?

MARLES: Well, I think understandably the Secretary of War is very focused on what's happening in Iran. I mean, to be fair, this is, you know, we certainly support the objective here of denying Iran a deployable nuclear weapon, but this is not a conflict that has been ours. We have had engagement with the United States —

SPEERS: The President's constant suggestion that we're not willing to help the United States. Isn't that worth a conversation?

MARLES: Well, again, I'm not going to continue to give a commentary or do any commentary on the President's comments. I mean, we speak with the United States clearly, but we understand that this is their conflict in which they are engaged. And I think it's understandable that the Secretary of War of the United States would be entirely focused on that.

SPEERS: In your press club speech on Thursday, you mounted a strong defence of the US alliance. You described it as fundamental to Australia's national security. Are you worried support here in Australia for the alliance is slipping under this President?

MARLES: Well, I think it's really important for all Australians to understand how significant the relationship is and that the relationship is not one that should be measured in the context of any given US administration or, for that matter, any given government in Australia. We've had the alliance in place since 1951. It's really, in practice, existed prior to that. And this is a long-term strategic alliance in the national interest of our country, based on the fact that our two countries have shared values — we are both democracies, we both have the rule of law, we both have freedom of speech, and all of those endure well beyond governance of any persuasion on either side of the —

SPEERS: This is the concern many have right now. The President goes to war without consulting allies, then berates them, says his only check on power is his own morality, not the international rule of law. He threatens civilian targets. I mean, is he helping to uphold the sort of rules that you're talking about here?

MARLES: Well, I'm not going to walk down that path in terms of giving, again, a commentary on what President Trump says. I think you are asking a really important question about the value of the alliance. And to be clear, across a whole range of levels, the alliance is really important in terms of the economy, culturally. But from a defence point of view, I mean, right now, if you look at the Indo-Pacific Command, it's the largest theatre command of the United States Armed Forces. Institutionally now, the deputy in the Army, the Navy and the Air Force are Australians. We operate there at a two-star level, major generals. And that says a lot about how we are trusted by the United States Armed Forces. But it's also so important in terms of the presence of the United States Armed Forces, particularly through the Indo-Pacific Command, in terms of providing a strategic balance within the Indo-Pacific. And there is no strategic balance without the presence of the United States. And so this continues to be a critically important relationship for Australia, and it will be for decades to come.

SPEERS: — Ok.

MARLES: You know our job right now, as any given government, if you will let me finish, is to manage the relationship while we sit in the chair and we are managing the relationship with the Trump administration. We are doing that well. But this is something which should not be measured over a couple of years. This is a relationship which is measured over decades.

SPEERS: OK, let me turn to your new National Defence Strategy. It lays out the threat environment that Australia is facing and refers to one country in particular. China's growing national power and increasingly potent military capabilities remain the primary driver of changes to Indo-Pacific security dynamics, it says. What is the most likely threat facing Australia?

MARLES: Well, I think I described that in my speech on Thursday. I mean, we need to be building a defence force that can give pause for thought for any given adversary that would seek to coerce us. You know, that is our most consequential risk. And as an island trading nation, with a growing proportion of our national income derived from trade and the physical manifestation of that being our sea lines of communication, all of that actually has been put into stark focus in terms of what we're seeing play out right now. That is what needs to be protected. That is what is vulnerable. And that is the defence force that we need to build, and that is what we've been doing.

SPEERS: And just to pick up on what you said there, the threat of coercion that Australia is facing, is that really the bigger threat than any direct attack on Australia?

MARLES: I think the risk of coercion is the major risk here. I mean, and I've said this on numerous occasions, we have a whole lot of benefits as a country in terms of our geography being surrounded by oceans. And there is a whole lot of protection at one level that comes from that. On the other hand, the risk that comes from that is that we are highly dependent on sea lines of communication, and we can see that being played out right now. And so what we need to have is a defence force that has the capability to project. The geography of our national security lies well beyond our coastline, or even our immediate waters. And it's why we need to build a defence force which has the capability to get out there. That's why we need, for example, a long-range nuclear-powered submarine, but it's also why we need longer-range strike missiles, a more capable surface fleet, northern bases which can send our Air Force further, and it's why we need a more amphibious Army. And all of those are what we are seeking to build under the National Defence Strategy 2026, but really coming out of the Defence Strategic Review in 2023. And I think what's important here, David, is that we now, as a nation, have strategic clarity about the kind of defence force that we are trying to build, which is very different to what we had when we came to government, where we were really working off strategic settings which dated right back to the 1980s. This is our risk and this is the defence force that we need to build.

SPEERS: I guess the question is, given all of that threat and need for additional resources, you've committed in this review to lift defence spending as a proportion of GDP from 2.8 per cent under the new measurement to 3 per cent by 2033. NATO countries have committed to reach 3.5 per cent by 2035. Why can't you go that far?

MARLES: Well, again, what we have always said, and the GDP measure is an imperfect measure, and we really seek to kind of refer more to the dollars that we spend here. But as the Prime Minister has made clear, what we try to do is, is in a sense of the process that I have just described, understand our strategic environment, think about the defence force that we seek to build, and then resource it. That's what we are doing. And what that process has yielded since we've come to office is an increase in defence expenditure of $117 billion over the next 10-year planning window, which is the biggest peacetime increase in defence spending in our country's history. And, David, to put that into context, in almost nine years of the Abbott–Turnbull–Morrison government, when they were wrestling with just the same kind of strategic dilemmas that we are facing today, they put about $10 billion into that 10-year planning window, which is to say we were doing 12 times as much in four years as what the Liberals did in nine. We inherited effectively a lost defence decade from the Liberals, and that's what we're seeking to redress. But we are absolutely doing that.

SPEERS: Defence Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, thanks for joining us this morning.

MARLES: Thanks, David.

ENDS