Defending Australia Summit 2026 Q&A

SUBJECTS: AUKUS; Collins Class LOTE; Defence Spending; Middle East Conflict; Indo-Pacific; Taiwan

CAMERON STEWART, MODERATOR: Okay, Richard, first of all, thank you very much for coming along tonight and taking questions. On behalf of The Australian we definitely appreciate it. Hugely important to discuss these issues and further national security debate, which is what we're all about.

RICHARD MARLES, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: Absolute pleasure.

STEWART: So, on a happy note, I just wanted to move slightly to the news of the day. It probably happened while you were on an aeroplane but Labor MP Ed Husic, you would have seen, has called for a caucus vote on AUKUS saying that the deal has changed and it should be revisited. What do you say to Labor MPs like Ed, who say Labor should revisit AUKUS?

MARLES: Well look, I mean, obviously Ed is very much entitled to his opinion, but I think what I'd really want to make clear is that our government is unambiguously supportive of AUKUS. We did that from opposition. From the moment that we came to government we sought to fashion AUKUS, you know, from an important arrangement with three countries, but an arrangement which needed flesh put on the bone. We did that with the optimal pathway that we announced in the beginning of 2023 and we have, since then, been completely focused on delivering that. Both delivering the incredible capability that it will provide for the Navy, but really for our Defence Force. I mean, this is the single biggest leap in our military capability, really, I think since the foundation of the Navy. It's also the single biggest industrial project that our country's ever engaged in, you know, larger than Snowy Hydro. Now we speak to members of the caucus all the time and beyond that, members of the labour movement. This was a matter that was debated extensively at the last national conference of the Labor Party and overwhelmingly AUKUS was endorsed and we continue to move down the path. In terms of what's been reported in relation to the meeting that we had on Saturday, there is a change in terms of the third of the Virginia classes going from being what had been intended to be a new submarine to being an in service submarine. We're talking about a single submarine. I mean, the first two were always going to be in service. Nothing's changed about that. And the bulk of AUKUS actually is the building of our own submarines in Adelaide and nothing is changing there. So, in the context of the bigger picture here, this is not a huge part of it. You wouldn't describe it as fundamental. And actually, you know, from our perspective, we welcome this.

STEWART: Ok, but you've got, for example, also former Labor Minister Peter Garrett today has talked about a public inquiry they're going to hold into the AUKUS issue. Would you accept that there are a lot of people in Labor, a minority, but nevertheless who felt that Labor was railroaded somewhat, Anthony Albanese was railroaded somewhat into AUKUS at that moment when Scott Morrison signed up to it. Are they now finding their voice? How are you going to deal with this? Because a split in the Labor Party over AUKUS would obviously give your opponents a big political free kick.

MARLES: Yeah, I just think everyone needs to just take a deep breath. I mean, I get in terms of the news of the day that The Australian is going to be kind of breathless about this and want to write on it. Just remember we went through a process in the lead up to our last national conference where there were significant voices within the broader labour movement who were putting a question on AUKUS. We debated it. We took the issue to the floor of the national conference – a body which goes beyond just the parliamentary party, but is the entire movement. And AUKUS was overwhelmingly endorsed. I mean, it was not close in terms of that vote. And so, you know, the labour movement has gone through its processes as extensively in respect of AUKUS as we have in relation to any issue. And the result of that has been clear. And so, you know, what we are doing as a government is continuing to pursue this, as we should. It's the right thing in terms of what our country needs. And it's a massive endeavour and we will be doing our part, so long as we are the steward of it, to deliver it.

STEWART: The optimal pathway for AUKUS has changed, as you say, the third submarine, the Virginia class, will now be a used submarine rather than a new one. Is that an olive branch to a degree to the Americans to make it easier for them to agree to the ultimate transfer of Virginia class submarines?

MARLES: No, I think that over reads that, to use that kind of language. There have been challenges in the US industrial base. There's no secret in that. There was no secret in that when the optimal pathway was first arrived at. And we knew that in order to – well firstly, we knew a few things. One is we couldn't wait until the early 2040s for the first new addition to our submarine capability, to our submarine fleet. Extending the life of Collins is a really important piece of the puzzle but we needed something else, clearly, to get us to a future nuclear‑powered submarine capability. And what we inherited, frankly, did not have that as part of it. What we inherited was a plan really not to see the first nuclear‑powered submarine until the early 2040s. That we were able to negotiate with the United States to have them transfer Virginia class submarines to us is extraordinary. I mean, there is no precedent for that ever before in terms of how America has handled this technology. There were challenges in the industrial base, as I said. It's why we did the extraordinary step of actually contributing money financially, significantly billions, to the American industrial base to increase their rate of production. Not just production, but sustainment as well. On this day, there are 200 Australian tradespeople in Pearl Harbor helping to get Virginia class submarines out to sea for the US Navy. And indeed, the advent of Submarine Rotation Force‑West will provide another avenue to do sustainment closer to the field of operation where we can get more sea days for the US Navy. Now that's been the challenge. And actually, I think we're meeting that challenge and we feel very confident about that. To finish the point, we were clearly at the time fitting in with an American production and sustainment schedule. You know, like our preference actually from the outset would have been to have in service submarines, because what it would mean was that we were operating a consistent class of submarines which would provide consistency for our submariners and for those maintaining the submarines. It's not what was then available in terms of the sustainment and production schedule that America had to offer. And the issue associated with where this had been was that we faced the prospect of basically at a point in time operating four classes of submarines. So, the end of Collins, in service Virginias, new Virginias, and then the new submarines that we'd be building in Adelaide. So in what is already a very complicated endeavour, we need to be chasing simplicity as much as we can. And so actually, this is a really good outcome for us. It's better financially and we're pleased that America is able to do this.

STEWART: So Richard, you talked about the pressures on the American production of Virginia class submarines. Ten days ago, I was in London. I went to Whitehall and interviewed Sir Stephen Lovegrove, Keir Starmer's special representative on AUKUS. He said to me, it will be a colossal task – didn't say it can't do it – a colossal task was his quote, to reinvigorate the British submarine base to deliver the SSN‑AUKUS up in Barrow. So you've got our two AUKUS partners both struggling with production. To the Ed Husics of the world, do you still say we can definitely do it?

MARLES: We can do it. And more to the point, we are doing it. It's a huge thing. I know one keeps saying that, but you don't do huge things without challenge. But I mean everyone just has to take a step back here and really think carefully about what some of the propositions are being put forward by those who rush out and say what's the contingency plan? What's plan B? We let go of continuous building of submarines when we did not continue the continuous build of the Collins class under the Howard government. Okay. From that moment forward to get on the horse of building a new successor to the Collins class and the industrial bases, and it's to your point, are such around the world that we're not going to get a new submarine unless we build it ourselves. This means necessarily we are talking about a multi‑decade endeavour. Not going to happen unless you stick with it. Now when the Coalition came into government in 2013, their first play was Japan. That was actually plan A. The Attack class submarines with France was plan B. AUKUS was plan C. That's what we're actually onto right now. That didn't come to bear until eight years after the Coalition government were elected. And now you've got former Coalition prime ministers effectively advocating that we should be pursuing plan D. Well that's not pursuing plan D, that's just deciding you're not going to do it. Because if you keep chopping and changing what is a multi‑decade project every three or four years, then by definition you're not doing it. And then take a step back and look at this: we are a three ocean nation. A three ocean nation. A cursory glance of the map makes it unthinkable that we would not have a cutting edge long‑range submarine capability. There is only one choice here and that is that we stick and that's what we're going to do.

STEWART: Richard, the last question on AUKUS, you've recently announced – we’ve got to keep the Collins class in service as much as possible – you've recently announced a scaled down LOTE, if you like, to try and extend the life of the boats, you say that will still extend them by 10 years. You are a sensible, reasonable man. Let's assume that you are Defence Minister in the 2040s, which I'm sure is your career ambition here.

MARLES: Indeed. 

STEWART: Would you send a submarine designed in the 1980s to battle in the 2040s?

MARLES: Well, I mean there's a bit in that question. So, firstly we're not scaling back, we're scaling up. We are increasing our expenditure on the Life of Type Extension of Collins. That's a really important point. I mean, what we inherited again was a grossly underfunded Life of Type Extension program from the Coalition. We are as much as doubling what needs to be spent on increasing the life of Collins. I mean, the short answer to your question is yes – done right, we can get Collins through to the 2040s and we need to. But what's also inherent in your question is how it is so important that we pursue AUKUS. I mean, just think about the question you've asked and then overlay it with the suggestions of some that we should now move to a different contingency. Because the necessary implication of that is that you would then be having Collins going even further because that's actually the only capability we have in the water right now. I mean, the very rationale of the question that you ask demands that we stick with AUKUS, which is what we are going to do. Now, I get that people are going to be consistently asking me questions: is AUKUS going to happen? Are our other partners, our countries still supportive? Are they meeting insurmountable challenges? Do you have division in your own ranks? We'll get all of those questions. That's fine. It's completely fine. I totally expect those questions to be asked of me for as long as I'm doing this job. But just also remember every milestone that we have needed to meet we're meeting. The Submarine Rotation Force‑West is going to start next year, on time, as planned. The Skills and Training Academy at the Osborne naval shipyard in Adelaide being built right now, as is the yard which will construct the future nuclear‑powered submarine. This thing is getting done and there will be a whole lot of voices who mightn’t like it and you'll write those voices up. But in the meantime we are getting this thing done. 

STEWART: And we have to pay for it, so let me ask about defence spending. At the moment there seem to be two languages. One, the NATO language and one, the old fashioned GDP ratio language. You prefer the NATO formula. What do you say to the argument that it's a much less transparent formula? For example, it includes veterans cost which the US doesn't use. The NATO definition doesn't talk about using intelligence funding. Defence budget guru Marcus Hellyer says you're cooking the books on NATO funding formula. What's your response?

MARLES: Look, my response is that all of you who are engaged in this debate are diving down a rabbit hole and I'll let you go down there. It's not my preference to do either of those. And it's actually wrong to say that that's what we are choosing. What we talk about is real dollars. That's the measure and that's how we would like to be judged relative to our nation's history. If you like, relative to what the former Coalition government did when they were in the business of increasing defence spending. So we have, through four successive increases in defence spending– not talking about percentages now, I mean the very notion of GDP is that it’s a relative number so you can be spending the same amount on defence, but GDP moves and suddenly it looks as though you're spending more or less. Like it takes you down a rabbit hole to even think about that. But I'll get to it in a moment. The fundamental measure which we should all be thinking about is dollars. And that's the language that we speak. Now in four separate increases to defence spending – in the ‘23 Budget, the ‘24 Budget, ‘25 MYEFO and now the ‘26 Budget – we have combined increased defence spending over the planning decade by $117 billion compared to what we inherited. That's not veterans. That's not the other stuff you're talking about. That's not percentages of GDP. $117 billion. $30 billion over the forward estimates. Now, by comparison, the former Coalition government injected $30 billion over the planning decade in the 2016 White Paper, most of that was back ended. Two years later they took $20 billion out of defence and spread it somewhere else under the guise of a structural adjustment, which meant that in net terms they increased defence spending by $10 billion over the planning decade. So how we would like to be judged is that we've done 12 times as much in terms of defence spending in four years as what the Abbot‑Turnbull‑Morrison government did in nine. And it's on that basis that we make the argument that this is the biggest peacetime increase in defence spending in our country's history. 

Now, I make that argument without reference to any of the measures, Cameron that you've just referred to. The only point of those measures is to give an international comparison. And I get that is the only way you can kind of assess the relative measures of what's going on in differing countries. And so the measure that does give an apples with apples comparison with other countries is the NATO measure. And when you do that, what you find is that right now we're at 2.8 [per cent]. I mean, whatever you include in there, it's apples with apples comparison. We're at 2.8 [per cent]. That puts us ahead of all the G7 countries in NATO, with the exception of the United States. So more than Canada– on this day, more than Canada, more than the UK, more than France, more than Italy, more than Germany. Less than the Nordics, the Baltics, Poland – the front line, if you like, with Russia – but more than the rest. More than Korea, more than Japan, more than New Zealand, the other IP4 countries. That is where our spending's at and we are committed by, or we will be by the end of this month, by law in the Budget to taking that to 3 per cent of GDP by 2033.

STEWART: But, Richard, let's have a brief apples-to-apples comparison with Australian tradition and history. You say you want to get to, you're aiming to get to 3% of GDP under the NATO measure by 2033. What's that in the traditional measure?

MARLES: Well, what it is –

STEWART: I've never heard you answer that –

MARLES: Because the traditional measure, I mean the traditional measure is dollars. It's 170 –

STEWART: In the traditional GDP measure. All white papers have done for decades.

MARLES: White papers and integrated investment programs speak in terms of dollars over the planning decade. Now, Cameron, you can go down and wander around in the rabbit hole with all the others who want to do it. Fine. I'm not going to join you there. We use the NATO comparison, if you want to have a like-for-like comparison with other countries around the world. But if you want to know what we're actually spending relative to what we have historically done, what white papers have said, you can look at the dollars; they are there.

STEWART: I guess I'm thinking Australia went from imperial to metric, and for many years people mention both. But this is like the figure that can't be said, the old-fashioned GDP figure.

MARLES: What is not fair in terms of the way you've characterised it is that that measure was never imperial or metric. It is dollars, which is actually how we've measured it, and that is how we seek to be judged. And, you know, we haven't had a particular focus on it in the sense of comparisons with other countries around the world. But clearly there is a certain significant comparison which is happening today. So, let's compare apples with apples. And that's where the comparison lies.

STEWART: Just in the couple of minutes we've got left, geopolitics. We saw in the Donald Trump–Xi Jinping summit recently, Xi Jinping raised tensions, if you like, by warning Trump that any mislanding in Taiwan could lead to an extremely dangerous situation. We've now seen the US, at the moment, pause an arms sale to Taiwan that had been agreed. And the President actually described that as a good bargaining chip. You must be concerned by developments like that?

MARLES: Well, look, I mean, what we want to see is no change to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. What I heard Secretary Hegseth say in his address to the Shangri-La Dialogue on Saturday was that America definitely wasn't changing its position. It was maintaining a consistent position in respect of this, and that that was very much asserted by President Trump in his meeting with President Xi. And again, I kind of, if you step back a little bit further and look at the key strategic documents of the United States—their National Security Strategy and National Defence Strategy that they released at the end of last year—I mean, it speaks with a clear voice about the importance of Taiwan. And so, you know, I take that at face value, and certainly from the position of the government, our position remains constant and has not changed.

STEWART: And with Iran, we're part of a large coalition to support freedom of navigation. We gave a Wedgetail aircraft. You said you'd consider whether Australia would give any more. Would you rule out ever sending a warship in any scenario?

MARLES: We will talk with our partners, and that is principally the UK and France, in terms of a multinational military mission. But, you know, obviously we speak with Sam Paparo in terms of, as I said before, that the operational deployment of what we do is done with very close consultation with INDOPACOM. We will consult with all of our partners about the way in which we can best contribute. We've committed an E-7, but we have said that we are open to doing more. Obviously, all of this is when conditions allow, and it's a bit hard to speculate beyond that because it's hard to know exactly what those conditions might look like. But I think what is important is that, you know, you've got a group of 40 countries coming together saying, you know, when the moment is right, they'll be there. And I think also what's really important is those 40 countries, and others, of course, asserting the importance of the Strait of Hormuz being open, that we see a normalisation of the global fuel supply chain, and that freedom of navigation generally—and specifically in the Strait of Hormuz—is profoundly important.

STEWART: And lastly, I wanted to ask you about self-reliance. You say you want to see Australia achieving more defence self-reliance. We had Professor Paul Dibb talking to The Australian yesterday, saying he thinks that's necessary because the US is not as reliable a partner as they were. But putting that to one side about the issue of self-reliance, you say that, interestingly, though, at the same time, we have probably a greater American military presence in Australia than at any time since peacetime. We have the rotational force in Western Australia coming, we have the Marines in the north, we have industrial interoperability with our defence equipment. I mean, what does defence self-reliance look like for you? How would you like to see Australia become more defence self-reliant?

MARLES: Yeah, well, I mean, that is a good question. And the way in which you put it, I think, is good as well, in that there are lots of dimensions to this. And in terms of the, you know, my remarks that I made were really focused on how important it is that we are building defence relationships. Obviously, given Shangri-La Dialogue is focusing on the Indo-Pacific and our defence engagement with our neighbours, it clearly applies to the United States as well. And getting that element right is a critical part of how we secure our nation. But I think we need to have greater capability ourselves. You know, we need to be measured in terms of what we can fundamentally, militarily do—that must grow. And that's probably the way in which I would answer your question. It's not that we stop engaging with other countries. It's not that we see the alliance as anything less than what it has been and what it is now. In fact, it's the opposite. I think the alliance is as important today as it ever has been, and we need to engage with other countries, but we need to be doing it from the perspective of having greater capability. And it's really in that context that we need a long-range nuclear-powered submarine capability. We need a much more capable surface fleet, and we need it sooner rather than later. We need an air force that can project further from more capable northern bases. We need a more amphibious army, which is what we're building. And we need much greater cyber capability, which, in a sense, being geography-less, is at the heart of projection. We need all of that. And I think the final point in answering the question: we need real clarity about what our strategic challenge is. Our most consequential strategic risk is not so much that the continent is invaded, but it is that we would be coerced by any potential adversary in the future. And you only need to look at the closure of that significant sea lane, being the Strait of Hormuz, to understand what it might look like if we had coercion there. Well, we need the capability to give any potential adversary pause for thought. We need to be protecting undersea infrastructure, and we need to be providing for the peace and security, the collective peace and security, of the regions in which we live. And all of that means that we need a defence force that can get out there. Because the geography of our national security is not our coastline; it's much further afield. And so, when I describe all of the capabilities that we are seeking to build, at the heart of them is projection—impactful projection. Being able to get out there, and I think being able to build a defence force which can much better do that, is what it looks like to have a more self-reliant Australia.

STEWART: Thank you, Richard.

ENDS