Doorstop, Singapore

SUBJECTS: 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue; AUKUS; Pillar II Signature Project; Indo-Pacific; Maritime Security.

RICHARD MARLES, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: Well, welcome everyone. Once again, Singapore has hosted a really successful Shangri-La Dialogue. During the course of the last few days and indeed during the course of today, I've been able to meet with Prime Minister Lawrence Wong of Singapore, President To Lam of Vietnam. We've had meetings with my defence minister counterparts – Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of War in the United States; John Healy, Secretary of Defence in the UK; Catherine Vautrin, the Minister of the Armed Forces from France. We met ministers of course in our region – Shin Koizumi, the Minister for Defence from Japan; Gilberto Teodoro, the Minister for Defence in Philippines; C.S. Chan, Minister of Defence here in Singapore; and Chris Penk, the new Minister for Defence in New Zealand. Yesterday morning we had our first trilateral meeting between Japan, New Zealand and Australia, which was really successful. This morning we've had a meeting of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, a ministerial meeting, which again has been a very important gathering as one of the oldest groupings of defence ministers in this region. 

Yesterday afternoon we had the AUKUS Defence Ministers’ Meeting, which was a profoundly important meeting. What that meeting identified was that in terms of Pillar I – Australia's acquiring of a nuclear‑powered submarine capability – that this is on track and specifically the establishment of the Submarine Rotation Force-West from the end of next year. As Secretary Hegseth made clear, the administrative arrangements are now being put in place in the United States such that personnel are being chosen to come to Australia as part of the Submarine Rotation Force‑West. In terms of phase three of this, which is the building of the submarines in Adelaide, work is well underway in terms of the construction yard for the nuclear‑powered submarine production line, the skills and training academy. All of that is underway. But most significantly yesterday was the announcement that we made in respect of Pillar II. This is the first signature project that we have all committed to under Pillar II and that is to put in place cutting edge payloads and enabling systems for Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles. And this is being backed by real money in the case of Australia, around $80 million, which is going to be putting capability into the hands of the war fighter next year. And if you think about what Australia's been doing in this space with Ghost Shark, which is really the leading large, long‑range Undersea Uncrewed Vehicle, that is the kind of platform that we need to be building interchangeable high‑tech payloads for and that is the project that we have agreed in respect of Pillar II and it's a real breakthrough, I think, in terms of the journey of AUKUS. What we announced yesterday in relation to Pillar II is the most significant moment that we've had yet in relation to Pillar II.

I'd really want to thank Bastian Giegerich of the IISS for all the work that the IISS have done in putting on the Shangri-La Dialogue. I'd also like to extend my thanks to C.S. Chan and Lawrence Wong of Singapore. It's a huge endeavour on the part of Singapore to host Shangri‑La and they always do an incredible job. It is a fantastic part of the world to convene and from our point of view to be coming here, this is the leading gathering within our region of defence ministers, but it's increasingly one of the leading gatherings around the world in relation to defence ministers and we value it very highly. 

JOURNALIST: Minister Marles, there's a lot of focus on what the United States is doing, what its partners allies are doing. Obviously somewhat less focus on what China is doing this year, given the Chinese absence. What is it about China's military buildup that concerns you the most? What is the message you need to drive home to your people and other people in friendly countries why you're doing all of this buildup in response to what the Chinese are doing in terms of [inaudible]?

MARLES: Well, there's a few things to say there. In direct answer to your question, we've repeatedly raised our concerns here at Shangri‑La, but directly with China, that it is the building up of the Chinese military without the sense of strategic reassurance as to why that is occurring. That has been the point that we've been consistently making over a period of time and we continue to make that point to the Chinese. But let me say a few things though more broadly about that. Obviously, we are very focused on the rules‑based order. We believe it is profoundly important, particularly for countries that are not great powers. For middle powers like Australia, the rules‑based order is what gives us agency. And there's been a real focus that this Shangri‑La Dialogue on the maritime domain, it has been put into sharp relief by what's playing out in the Middle East. But there's also been a focus about the fact that traffic in the maritime domain is very much seaborne trade, as it's always been. But it's more than that now. It's undersea cables, it is telecommunications, fibre optic cables which are really the lifeblood of the modern global economy. And the rules of the road at sea now need to apply to the rules of the road on the seabed, and that's been a real topic of conversation here. Now we are very focused on the importance of those rules and that is our fundamental message here. In respect of China more broadly, we are meeting in the aftermath of the summit between President Xi and President Trump. That's something that we fundamentally welcome and we do– when the great powers are talking with each other, the world feels safer. So, you know, we very much welcome that gathering. So we do continue to make the point that military buildup needs to happen with strategic reassurance but we are also doing this in a context where we very much acknowledge the meetings that have occurred between the two presidents of China and America, but also in a context where what's happening in the world today, both in terms of technological development, but also what's happening in the Middle East, puts a sharp focus on the importance of the rules‑based order.

JOURNALIST: Just on the Virginias, there’s obviously been some concern about the production rate in the US, what that might mean for getting them to Australia on time. Did you and Secretary Hegseth discuss that yesterday? Did you get any assurances from him on those?

MARLES: Look, we have a sense of confidence about the production rates getting to where they need to get to. I mean we're well aware of the challenges in the US industrial base but we've been aware about that from the very beginning when the optimal pathway was announced back in 2023. And that's why we're making a financial contribution to the US industrial base to help it increase its production rate, but it's also why Australians– tradespeople who are training to work on nuclear‑powered submarines are doing that right now in the US, there’s about 200 Australian tradespeople at Pearl Harbor working on getting Virginia class submarines out to sea for the US Navy. That's a part of increasing the number of sea days for the US Navy with their Virginia class submarines. But you know, we've also emphasised the significance of establishing the Submarine Rotation Force‑West because that's going to add capability as well in terms of the sustainment of US Virginia class submarines. And all of that put together gives us a sense of confidence that the room will be there for the Virginia class submarines to be transferred to Australia in the early 2000s.

JOURNALIST: Minister, just on the submarines, you said yesterday that we get three Virginia class submarines from the existing fleet in the water rather than, I believe, two and one. Can you explain the rationale for that? And critics have already said this means we get three old subs rather than two old subs and one new sub, are we still going to pay the same amount for the same submarines?

MARLES: Very much appreciate that question. Look, we're really pleased with this outcome and it's been a live conversation, actually, from the beginning of the announcement of the optimal pathway and it does bear some explanation. I think the starting point here is that this is an incredibly complicated endeavour for two countries, the US and the UK, to be providing the capability to a third, Australia, to operate a nuclear‑powered submarine capability. It's only happened once before when America provided that technology to the UK decades ago. In the context of a very complicated endeavour, we need to place a premium on simplicity. If you think about the journey from what we are doing now, which is operating diesel electric powered Collins class submarines, through to the 2050s and beyond where we will just be operating the SSN‑AUKUS submarines that we are building in Adelaide, we right now have the prospect, based on what we were doing, which was two in service and one new submarine, of almost having four classes of submarines operating within our Navy at a point in time. Meaning the last of the Collins class, two in-service Virginias, a brand new Virginia, and then the SSN‑AUKUS. That gets pretty complicated in terms of how you're operating a fleet of submarines. What we will have here is a much simpler pathway. It will mean that the Virginia class submarines that we are acquiring will all be of the same type of. And I cannot overstate the significance of that, both in terms of the submariners who are operating them, but also the people who are working on them to sustain those submarines. Chasing simplicity is at the heart of why we have pursued this. You asked the question about cost and there's been some confusion here. So firstly, we are paying an amount to the US in terms of its industrial base. That is to create the space for the Virginia class submarines to be transferred to Australia. But then there is the purchase price in respect of each of the submarines and this will be more cost effective in relation to that and it'll be significant. But having said that, I'd also make the point that, you know, the way we are thinking about this is that the overall cost of the program is about .15% of GDP, that's the most useful way to think about it, and over the life of what we're doing here it doesn't fundamentally change that equation, but it helps. It definitely helps. 

JOURNALIST: So a significant saving in other words? Even though in the scheme of the program, it might be a rounding error, there’s a block of money– 

MARLES: There is. It is definitely cost effective and to be clear, you know, this is a very expensive program obviously and so we are talking trying to find every cost effective option as we walk down this path. So this is a very useful financial contribution to the cost of the overall program. But actually at the heart of this is chasing simplicity and it will be really important. And that obviously also kind of has a financial implication in terms of training and servicing. And so, this is a complicated endeavour. In the context of that, simplicity comes at a premium. Being able to have the same class of Virginia class submarines operating as part of this is really important. So we see this, actually, as a really good outcome. As I say, this has been a live conversation from the outset and I think to settle on this, which we've done at this AUKUS meeting, is a really important moment as well. 

JOURNALIST: On the UUV drone technology, as you know, China has been accused of damaging people around Taiwan. Are we going to see some of these Australian underwater drones being more actively involved in those waters? Is that the plan here?

MARLES: What we need to make sure of is that we are as capable as we can possibly be in the undersea domain. Talking about having long‑range submarines, that's a part of it, but as we look forward, having autonomous undersea capabilities which are cutting edge is absolutely critical for our Defence Force, for a maritime nation like Australia. And of course that is very much the same for the UK and the US and this signature project will see our countries operating at the highest level in terms of the systems and the payloads which are on the undersea vehicles that we are operating, the autonomous undersea vehicles that we are operating. And this will be looking at having payloads that are interchangeable, that are obviously common across the various platforms that we're operating. But we have platforms right now as we– you know, the Ghost Shark is really the leading long‑range autonomous platform in the world today. It's being made right now in Sydney with Anduril. It's in the Royal Australian Navy right now. But this is about making sure that what it's doing, what it has on board, the systems that it's operating are at the highest possible level. 

JOURNALIST: Is it aimed at China though?

MARLES: It is aimed at making sure that we have the most capable Navy possible and it goes to the suite of what is our strategic objectives with our Defence Force. And that is not about any particular country. We've made really clear we are seeking to build a defence force which can deter any adversary that seeks to coerce Australia. We are seeking to build a defence force which can make its contribution to the peace and stability of the regions in which we live; northeast Indian Ocean, here in Southeast Asia, in the Pacific. That's why we have a defence force. That's its job. And this is about ensuring that in the undersea domain that job can be carried out to the highest level possible.

JOURNALIST: [Inaudible] can you explain Australia’s relationship to other middle powers? Does this shift towards [inaudible]? 

MARLES: Well, I suppose to go to the last point first, no, it doesn't. We operate very extensively with the United States in terms of defence industry. It would be the country that we engage the most with in terms of defence industry and that's continuing to grow. I mean, to give you one example, we are manufacturing missiles in Australia now for the first time since the early 1970s. That began last year with Lockheed Martin, an American company, making GMLRS in South Australia. And so we continue all the extensive arrangements that we have with the United States defence industrial base, which really is very extensive. But that continues and it continues to grow and that's an example of it. But we also see that this is a time to be doubling down with friends and to be working as closely as we can with other nations, with other middle powers. And we have an extensive range of interests, both in an operational sense but also in a defence industry sense and Japan is a good example of that. I mean, we are doing more operationally with Japan than we've ever done before – more exercises, more training – but we're also doing more in a defence industry sense. Obviously we've chosen the Mogami class as the base for our future general purpose frigate which will be produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. We're very excited about that partnership, but it's an example. Be it here in Singapore, be it Indonesia, the Philippines, we are doing more at an operational level, but we are doing more with countries like Canada and a country like the UAE. So we are looking at how we can extend our relationships around the world and we see that in a challenging, volatile world, now is a time to be doubling down with friends and that's what we're doing. 

JOURNALIST: I've got a question about Pillar II. There seems to be a little bit of confusion as to what exactly this project is about. I see some media report it is the manufacturing of unmanned undersea vehicles and I don't think that's the [inaudible], it's the payload and the system? Can you talk a little bit about what these kind of payloads would look like and what these systems are?

MARLES: Yeah, good question. So this is not about the platform. We have differing platforms around our three countries. But just to say that we have been at the forefront of the development, particularly of the larger platforms and Ghost Shark is an example of that, but that's not the only platform we operate. Speartooth, for example, is a smaller but still quite large autonomous undersea vehicle. The UK, the US have their own platforms. But what we're trying to do here is make sure that we have common, cutting edge payloads that would be interchangeable across those platforms and also cutting edge enabling systems for those platforms. So this is about making sure that what those platforms do have a commonality about them but are also operating at the highest end, and it's really what's on them which determines what they can do and we want to make sure that these are as capable as possible. And, you know, there's clear timelines. This is about making sure that this is putting capability into the hands of the war fighter next year. And there's real money behind this. I mean, from Australia alone it's around $80 million, but comparable contributions from the US and the UK. So, you know, in total hundreds of millions of dollars are being invested in developing this capability.

JOURNALIST: Mr Deputy Prime Minister, in your address yesterday you linked the shadow fleet activity to undersea cable incidents and grey zone coercion. What evidence has convinced Australia that these are connected rather than separate maritime security incidents?

MARLES: Well, firstly in the speech yesterday I made a couple of points. One is, this is in the grey zone, which by definition means it's grey. Let's assume what we're talking about is accidents here, to take your question. Even at that level, what this is demonstrating is the fragility, if you like, of what is now critical global infrastructure. I mean if it is possible for an anchor to cut a cable in the middle of the night by accident that of itself ought to be a concern. But if there is any intention in respect of this, that requires our attention as well. And I think the fundamental point that we're making is that when we are thinking about the rules‑based order, it is now not just about seaborne trade, although it obviously clearly continues to be about that, but it's not just about that. We now need to be thinking about the seabed and what lies there because that is fundamental infrastructure for all of our countries. We are seeing incidents occur in relation to cables being disrupted. That needs to be our focus and we need to be making sure that the rules of the road at sea also apply to the seabed and that's really at the heart of my comments yesterday. And I think ensuring that is, first of all, about the preeminence of the rules‑based system, but it's also about how we can develop technologies which can help protect that infrastructure, but also calling on every nation to be a part of a global effort to make sure that that infrastructure, which is so important for the combined prosperity of us all, to be maintained.

JOURNALIST: Has Australia identified any actors, major actors behind damaging of the undersea cables?

MARLES: I'm not going to go further than what I've just said in my answer and what I said in my speech yesterday. This is a really important domain and it's one that all of us need to work hard on. As I said yesterday, this is a collective challenge and it demands a collective response which is actually what the rules‑based order is all about. And I think more generally, at times now it feels as though talking about rules is unfashionable. I think this is an example of why rules are just as important today, if not more important today, than they have ever been. And we also very much understand that there is a connection between rules and power. You know, the rules‑based order needs to be underpinned by power – a point that Secretary Hegseth made yesterday. We completely understand that and completely agree with that. But it's important that we are all, in the context of a power underwriting of this, we are all committed to a rules based system. Because that is actually what gives middle powers like Australia or smaller countries agency and it's also what ultimately ensures that critical infrastructure such as this is protected. 

JOURNALIST: [Inaudible] has the development of those payloads already begun, or can you tell us when it’s set to begin?

MARLES: There is work that has been done, I guess individually, in each country. So we're not starting from scratch. But as a project of AUKUS, this is happening right now. But a very defined timeline. This is about getting increased capability to the war fighter next year and we were really clear about this. We wanted this to have a very clear, short time frame backed up with real money and we've done all of that. And this will make a real difference in terms of the capabilities that our three countries operate. 

JOURNALIST: The US and China have said that they've stabilised the relationship but ultimately they are still long‑term strategic competitors. Are you, I guess, assured that these two powers can do that balance?

MARLES: Look, it's a very good question. We are seeing strategic competition but it's also important that that happens within a predictable framework and obviously seeing the major powers meet is important. I mean we welcome it. As I've said a number of times, the world feels safer when you see China and America meeting with each other and meeting in a productive way. And that was very much the readout from the meeting between President Xi and President Trump. I mean, none of this is simple but the fact that they are talking in this way we see is a very positive step. And we also know this is not a one off, the expectation is that they will meet a number of times before the end of this year again. And so we very much welcome that and we welcome it given that that happens in a context of strategic competition. And so it is really important that that conversation is happening. 

JOURNALIST: I’m just wondering, for the layman, could you give some examples of the payloads you’re talking about? What sort of things are in development for these UUVs? 

MARLES: It is a really good question, a very legitimate question and it's very difficult for me to give you a proper answer to that question and that's, you know– for obvious reasons we are talking about technologies that we seek to protect in terms of what they are, but it is about the full suite of what these platforms can do. 

JOURNALIST: Are we talking about both offensive and defensive capabilities? Surveillance [inaudible]. 

MARLES: Again, I'm reluctant to go into the specificities of it other than to say it is about the full range of what capabilities these platforms can do. But it is about making sure that this is absolutely at the cutting edge of technology and that there is interoperability and interchangeability between our platforms and defence forces. 

JOURNALIST: With your interaction overall with Chinese leaders and officials, what is the top concern but you raised to them and what did they tell you?

MARLES: Well, I mean I haven't had the opportunity to meet with my Chinese counterpart, obviously at this dialogue as Admiral Dong is not here. But I last met Admiral Dong at the ADMM Plus meeting in Kuala Lumpur towards the end of last year. We are very frank with our Chinese counterparts. We very much welcome, I should say, the ability to meet with them and we very much value, at a defence level, the dialogue that we can have with our Chinese counterparts. It was in fact here at Shangri-La back in 2022 that my meeting then with my Chinese counterpart was actually the first ministerial level meeting we'd had with China in a number of years in any context. So, for us, defence engagement is very important. And it is not that you will be able to solve every issue in those meetings, but you have a much better understanding of what we seek to do in a defence sense and what China is seeking to do in a defence sense. I mean, the issues that I've raised here today, that we speak about publicly, about strategic reassurance in terms of the buildup of military capabilities, we speak about that with our Chinese counterparts. What we also have done is sought to try and build a defence dialogue between Australia and China. And in fairness, you know, both sides have been working on that and we have seen the defence dialogue between Australia and China grow over the last four years and that's something we welcome. 

JOURNALIST: How did you assess the keynote address from General Secretary To Lam?

MARLES: I think it was fantastic to have General Secretary To Lam here. I think it's very significant to have the President of Vietnam providing the keynote address at Shangri‑La this year. I very much note his emphasis on the significance of rules for his country, and that very much accords with the way in which we see the importance of rules. And in that sense we feel that there is a growing strategic alignment between Australia and Vietnam. I was able to have a bilateral meeting with General Secretary To Lam and indeed General Giang who's my counterpart, who I've met on numerous occasions now, and we have a growing defence relationship with Vietnam which we deeply appreciate. I think the other point I'd highlight in relation to General Secretary To Lam's speech on Friday night was the emphasis that he placed on the importance of human development in terms of security. And it's absolutely right. We see this well amongst Pacific Island countries, for example, which are amongst some of the least developed countries in the world. Security is utterly linked to development. Where there is prosperity, where there is human development, that is in itself self a contributor to stability and peace. When that is all put in question, that is where you get volatility and instability. And I think General Secretary To Lam's comments about that were really important. And it is a reminder that as we seek to build a peaceful and stable Indo‑Pacific, we also need to be building a prosperous Indo‑Pacific. Fundamental human prosperity is a fundamental contributor to human security, and international security and peace. And I think that was a really important message to leave here at the Shangri‑La dialogue. Thank you everyone. Great to have a chat. 

ENDS