Address to the Australian Institute of International Affairs Gala Dinner

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The Hon Richard Marles MP

Deputy Prime Minister

Minister for Defence

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dpm.media@defence.gov.au

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16 November 2026

We are fast approaching the fifth anniversary of the war in Ukraine. In that time, by some estimates, there have been 2 million casualties, more than half a million dead. It is far and away the most significant conflict that has occurred on European soil since the end of World War II. 

Most of this year has been dominated by the war against Iran. 

In recent times, we’ve seen conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in South East Asia.  

On the African continent, we see war as well, particularly in Sudan. 

Indeed, right now there is more conflict around the world than there has been at any point since the end of the Second World War. 

In 2025, the global increase in Defence spending was US$2.9 trillion and it’s the 11th year in a row that we've seen an increase in global defence spending. 

Here in the Indo‑Pacific, we are seeing the biggest conventional military build-up that we have seen since the end of the Second World War, without any strategic reassurance. 

And all of this is why we have consistently said since we came to office that today we face the most complex, in some ways the most threatening strategic circumstances that we've seen since the end of the Second World War. 

When the Albanese Labor Government came to office back in 2022, the direction of the Defence establishment could, in essence, be described as doing today what we did yesterday. We do it this way because that's the way it's been done. And none of that should be seen as a criticism of either the Department of Defence nor the Australian Defence Force. Because that is a failure of policy. It is a failure of political leadership. Indeed Defence has really been asked to operate under a set of strategic settings which really found their origins back in the 1986 Dibb Review, which was conducted at the height of the Cold War. 

Yet since then, we've had the fall of the Berlin Wall, we’ve seen 9/11, we’ve seen Australia participate in the longest conflict in our history. 

The world is simply very different now. 

Yet the strategic landscape that we inherited in 2022 existed well before that. Russia annexed Crimea back in 2014. The South China Sea Arbitral Award occurred in 2016. But under the former Coalition government with their five different defence ministers, there was no reassessment of our strategic settings and Defence was chronically underfunded. In the entirety of that time, there was one increase in Defence spending to the 10-year Defence planning decade of $30 billion, a result of the 2016 Defence white paper. But then, a couple of years later, $20 billion of that was taken out. So a net increase of just $10 billion dollars to the 10-year Defence budget in almost nine years in office. 

Now by contrast, in the four and a half years since we have been in government, we have increased that same 10-year Defence spend by $117 billion. 

So at a time when we should have had strategic focus, what we inherited was strategic drift. 

When we came to government, the very first step we took was to institute the Defence Strategic Review, which was undertaken by Sir Angus Houston, a former Chief of the Defence Force, and Stephen Smith, a former Minister of Defence. When they handed their review down in April of 2023, they provided an assessment of our strategic landscape, they identified our most consequential strategic risk, they provided a description of the kind of Defence Force that we needed to build in order to meet that strategic moment. 

But more than that, they gave us an architecture going forward that every two years we would review that strategic posture, along with the Integrated Investment Program, our 10-year Defence procurement schedule. We did that in 2024, and we did that again this year in 2026. And what that has enabled us to do is give us strategic clarity. We can now articulate our most consequential strategic risk, which is not that the continent would invaded, but rather that any potential adversary might seek to disrupt the physical manifestation of our economic connection to the world, in particular our sea lines of communication. That more than 90 per cent of our liquid fuels are imported into this country is just one example of how important that trade is. 

And in addition, it made clear that the defence of Australia intimately connected with the peace and security of the regions in which we live and identified: the Pacific, the countries of the Pacific Island Forum, Southeast Asia, the nations of ASEAN, and the Northeast Indian Ocean, anchored by India, but including countries like the Maldives and Sri Lanka. And in the last four and a half years, I've visited pretty well every one of those countries. 

What becomes immediately clear from that assessment is that the geography of our national security lies well beyond the coastline of our nation and the coastline of our continent, and as a result, what we need is a Defence Force that can get out there. That can engage in impactful projection. A more amphibious Army. More capable northern bases that can project our Air Force further. Longer range missiles. A more capable surface fleet for the Royal Australian Navy, bolstered by Hunter class frigates and our new general purpose frigate, the first of which will come into service by the end of this decade in partnership with Japan. And of course, providing for an effective long‑range submarine capability under the banner of AUKUS. 

Now all of that requires resources. 

Most defence ministers, indeed most governments are only ever responsible for a single injection of funding into the Defence budget. But since our government has come to power in 2022, we've increased Defence spending in the 2023 budget, the 2024 budget, the 2025 mid-year economic outlook, and this year again in the 2026 budget. A total of $117 billion over the planning decade. 

We are now on track to take Defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP by 2033. And on this day, as a percentage of GDP, we are spending more on Defence than most countries in NATO, with the exception of the Nordics, the Baltics and Poland. But more than the UK, Germany, Italy, France. We’re spending more than our key partners in East Asia, Japan and Korea. We are doing all of this to provide for a much more capable Defence Force. Spending more over the decade, more over the next four years, an additional $30 billion, and more in the here and now. Indeed, in each of the last three financial years, we've set a record for Defence spending. 

Of course, all of that has been achieved by virtue of a partnership between Defence on the one hand, and Finance and Treasury on the other, because you cannot achieve Defence capability without resources. 

But a little understood part of the story of the last four and a half years has been providing confidence to Treasury and Finance that Defence understands the worth and the value of the public dollar and that it can effectively spend it. Because to be clear, when we came to government, that definitely was not Defence’s reputation. 

And so we've undertaken massive public sector reform, instituting the Defence Delivery Group, which from 1 July next year will become the Defence Delivery Agency, placing a much more acute focus on project delivery, making sure that we have much better cost assurance by having the Department of Finance far more present within the Department of Defence, and most critically, undertaking an audit of the Defence estate.

Now, Defence is one of the largest landowners in Australia, occupying hundreds of properties.

But it was clear that many of them were underutilised, some not useful. And so back in 2023, we commissioned Jim Miller and Jan Mason, two experts in the field, to undertake a thorough audit of the Defence estate.

And what they found was damning.

In respect of those properties that we were not properly using or using at all, it wasn't that we were spending thousands of dollars on maintaining them. It was that we were spending hundreds of millions of dollars on maintaining properties that we don't use and squandering valuable personnel hours.

Which is why they observed that Defence today was living under the burden of a failure to make difficult decisions over the past decades.

They are difficult decisions, they're really difficult.

I mean, there is an understandable amount of emotion which is connected to somebody who has provided service at a number of these sites.

You only need to look at what's been happening in respect of Victoria Barracks Sydney over the last few months.

I don't think there's anyone who would seriously make an argument that in 2026 Victoria Barracks Sydney is central to the defence of Australia.

But nor is this really about protecting the heritage of Victoria Barracks.

Because the heritage value of all of these buildings is protected by law, and now we are commissioning the Australian War Memorial to interpret these sites, to tell the Defence stories connected with them, to protect their heritage and tell that story to a much bigger and larger audience.

But we simply cannot continue to spend, in the case of Victoria Barracks Sydney, $200 million over the next decade on a site that we do not properly use.

Right now, in this moment, it is impossible to disconnect the Defence Estate Audit and the decisions that we are taking there with the strategic challenges that we face in the world today.

Every person who wears our nation's uniform matters.

Every hour they spend in it counts.

And every dollar spent resourcing them is absolutely precious.

Serious times demand serious decisions.

And when I'm asked what keeps me awake at night, a look at what is happening in the world today is a quick answer to that.

But what enables me to sleep at night is knowing that we are doing everything within our power, everything within my power, to build the capability for the men and women of the Australian Defence Force.

And I could not sleep at night if I had shirked a difficult decision like that.

It has also been really important to demonstrate that we can effectively spend money, and there is no better example of that than what we are doing in respect of AUKUS.

Now, when we came to government, what we inherited was a relationship between three countries and an idea.

That is a very significant achievement of the former Coalition government, and I pay tribute to that.

But our job is to translate that idea into a pathway and then deliver it.

And when we announced that pathway back in March of 2023, the pathway brought forward by a decade the first moment in which we would have an Australian-flagged nuclear-powered submarine.

The first major milestone was to be the establishment of the Submarine Rotational Force – West at HMAS Stirling at the end of 2027.

Today, as we stand here, a year off that date, there are already American personnel right now at HMAS Stirling readying for that moment.

We have built 125 accommodation units on base, another 70 in the community. There are another 200 being built right now. Last week, we announced the construction of another 92.

There are 250 Australian tradesmen who have gone to Pearl Harbor for two years since. 60 of them have already returned to HMAS Stirling, which means that right now the workforce is taking shape which literally has years of experience working with nuclear-powered submarines.

Right now, on this day, the USS Colorado, a US Virginia-class submarine, is at HMAS Stirling undertaking a maintenance period.

This is the fourth maintenance period of a nuclear-powered submarine at Stirling in the last two years: USS Hawaii, USS Vermont, USS Colorado, all Virginia-class submarines in the US Navy, and HMS Anson, a UK Astute-class submarine.

And having been able to get that work under our belt now makes HMAS Stirling a much more capable base, and we are completely confident that we are ready for the establishment of the Submarine Rotational Force – West this time next year.

In Adelaide, at the Osborne Naval Shipyard, we are building the submarine construction yards where the first Australian-made submarines will be built.

The Skills and Training Academy is literally coming out of the ground, and it will be completed in about 15 months' time. And within six years, it will be training 1,000 apprentices a year.

Indeed, the first building at Osborne has now been completed, and we're on track to cut steel on that first submarine in Australia by the end of this decade.

At the Henderson Defence Precinct in Western Australia, we have now finally agreed on the settled boundary of that precise site with the Western Australian Government and with other owners along the Henderson Strip.

In every single way, AUKUS is now happening.

And when it was first announced, when the Optimal Pathway was first announced, there were lots of voices out there that said that this would never occur.

Let me be clear: there are a number of those voices still there today.

But as we take every step down this path, those voices become less and less loud as the reality of Australia's future nuclear-powered submarine capability manifests.

And all this is anchored in our own campaign of strategic reassurance with our neighbours and with the region to make clear that as we are making Australia strong, as we are building our own defence capability, its purpose is to provide for the peace and security of the region in which we live.

And so under our government, we have concluded more defence and security agreements with the countries of our region than any government in our history. With Indonesia, with Timor-Leste, an alliance with Papua New Guinea, soon to be with Solomon Islands, with Vanuatu, along with long-standing relationships with France and New Zealand.

They are the countries which ring our continent.

But in addition to that, we now have a new alliance with Fiji, new agreements with Japan, a new agreement with the Philippines signed just yesterday, new agreements with Singapore, new agreements with India.

All of it demonstrates that as we seek to build our capability, we are fundamentally doing it in partnership with our neighbours.

And so all this, our strategic clarity, the resourcing of it, the delivery of it, the anchoring of it in our relationships with the region, is a complete transformation of our Defence Force in the last four and a half years.

And I really want to thank the men and women of the Australian Defence Force and the men and women of the Department of Defence, because they are the ones who have actually made all of this happen.

And whilst it is impossible to predict the future, I know that as a result of their work, they have built a Defence Force which is in the best possible position to keep Australians safe.

Thank you.

ENDS

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