Defending Australia 2025 Summit Q&A

SUBJECTS: Chinese Military Build-up; Chinese Naval Vessels off the Coast of Australia; Defence Spending; Defence Industry; AUKUS; Middle East Conflict. 

CHRIS UHLMANN, MODERATOR: I might start by just getting the sense that you have of what the circumstances we face are. Is China a military threat to Australia?

RICHARD MARLES, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: China has engaged in the biggest conventional military build-up since the end of the Second World War. That’s a big thing to say. Bigger than at any point during the Cold War. Now to properly nail that down, it is also engaging in a nuclear build up as well, not on the same scale as what we saw during the Cold War but in conventional terms bigger. And it unquestionably is shaping the region in which we live. It unquestionably is at the heart of the complex strategic circumstances that we face. Really, it is shaping more than our region, it is shaping the world. So as we undertook the Defence Strategic Review in the way that I just described, and the way in which we have really tried very carefully and thoughtfully to think about what our strategic challenge represents and the kind of Defence Force that we need to build, clearly, the Chinese military build-up is a critical part of that.

UHLMANN: That’s… Chinese military threat to Australia is what’s driving,

MARLES: It is the fact of a country which is engaging in a military build-up of that scale. But perhaps, you know, to add to it, it is doing so without strategic reassurance. So every country has a right to properly invest in its own defences. But what's really important is that you provide strategic reassurance to your neighbours and to the world about what that's about. As we have gone about AUKUS, as we have gone about increasing our own defence spending, the Defence Strategic Review and the like, we invested an enormous amount of diplomatic effort into our immediate region – the Pacific, South East Asia, North East Asia, the North East Indian Ocean – about what it is that we're trying to do; why we are building up our defence forces in the way that we are. China simply hasn’t done that–

UHLMANN: Although if it does a live fire exercise off our coast, I would have thought that’s sending a pretty loud message as to what they’re contending? 

MARLES: It is very much not diplomacy or defensive diplomacy obviously, I know that's the point that you’re making. None of that provides strategic reassurance. 

UHLMANN: Were they targeting our cities? Were they rehearsing targeting our cities, or any facilities onshore in Australia while they were doing that? You would know the answer. 

MARLES: Look, I do know the answer to the question. I think it's not helpful, I think, for me in this – 

UHLMANN: The answer is yes, isn’t it?

MARLES: Well, you can now ask and answer the question. I don't think it's appropriate or helpful for me in this situation to speculate about it for a range of reasons, well, and the most significant being what we did with the Chinese task group was to engage in an unprecedented level of surveillance on that task group. So we do know exactly what they were doing and exactly what they're rehearsing. For me to start talking about that obviously reveals our surveillance capabilities, which is why I'm reluctant to – 

UHLMANN: But I would expect you would know whether or not they were rehearsing targeting Australian cities or facilities onshore in Australia, and that sends you a very loud message, doesn’t it?

MARLES: Very clear about what they were doing. Perhaps I would say that I think I don’t think there are any capabilities that were put on display there which are particular surprise. And we were also, as I say– being able to surveil that task group in the manner which we did also sends an important statement. 

UHLMANN: The other thing, though, was that we were unable to really keep pace with them because our fuel supply ships were in dry dock. So doesn’t that– you’re talking about projecting power, we can’t even project power around our own continent. 

MARLES: Well we did– we absolutely kept pacing them the whole way. We were– there was, as I say, an unprecedented level of surveillance of that task group, both in terms of the naval vessels that tailed them, but also the air assets that we had deployed. And I think the ability for us to do that throughout the entirety of the period in which that task group was in the vicinity of Australia sends a very strong message back. 

UHLMANN: We have limited time, but to underline this point, one of the things that's important in convincing the Australian people that they need to spend money on Defence is the government tells them what the threat is. And it seems to me, because the Prime Minister was asked this question last week and refused to say whether or not China is a threat. Well, if the Australian people do not perceive a threat, why should they spend money on defence?

MARLES: Well actually, I think if you– I mean I certainly agree with the proposition that it is important to convey to the Australian people exactly what our threats are. That's why, in the speech that I've just given, there's an analysis which really is born out of the Defence Strategic Review of both our landscape for that, but also the strategic threat which we face, the exact strategic threat that we face, which is unlike an articulation that you've seen from a government in decades. So what I absolutely refute is the idea that the government’s not being doing that. What we have brought to bear a strategic clarity of what we are trying to achieve with our Defence Force, based on what actually is the strategic threat to Australia, in a way that we haven't seen governments– 

UHLMANN: $57 billion over 10 years, but the vast bulk of that spending comes in the last part of that time period. Your counterpart said to you, when you were at the Shangri-La Dialogue, that we should be spending 3.5 per cent of GDP. I don’t want to get hung up on the figure, but he said the threat from china was imminent. Do you believe that that threat is real and that it is imminent? And if so, why doesn’t our defence spending reflect that?

MARLES: Well, a few things to say, because there's a lot contained in what you've included in the question you've just asked…

MARLES: As I said in my speech, we have spent more in defence procurement in the last financial year than Defence ever has. That's not spending (inaudible). We spent more in the last financial year than we ever have. Not a factor which gets reported that much, but is a fact nevertheless. And we will spend more again this year. So in the here and now, we are spending more. We are increasing our defence spending in what is the most, as I said earlier, the largest peacetime increase in defence spending in Australia's history. Now, all we've said, and might I say, all of that is acknowledged by countries around the world, including the United States. Defence spending doesn't happen in any country overnight. And no country out there is announcing an overnight increase in defence spending. It is something which is built up over time. If you look at what we have done in the last couple of years, it is far more in terms of increasing defence spending that you have seen governments do in a decade. 

UHLMANN: The question will be, is it enough? 

MARLES: But the point then Chris is that there will be a constant frame around should we do more? Fair enough to ask the question, but to ask that question in the absence of acknowledging what has been done, I don’t think is fair, nor is it fair to not focus on the prioritisation of defence spending. 

UHLMANN: And I acknowledge what has been done, and I accept what you are saying, but what I'm saying is if that threat is real, if that threat is imminent then what we are spending does not match the need. 

MARLES: I don't accept that. The strategic threat that we are seeking to meet is to deter any potential adversary that would seek to coerce us. That is our strategic threat, and I am confident in that we have the agency in this country and we are on a path to build up our defence force to meet that threat. Can I just make this point when United States talks in the terms as it did, as Secretary Hegseth did at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore it really is in a different context, in the sense of the prospect of great power contest. Now, in the context of great power contest, what we would bring to bear in terms of our military capability is inevitably going to be marginal relative to. 

UHLMANN: But what you said, though, is what happens if China takes Taiwan by force? Do we export iron ore anymore? Do we export coal anymore? Do we export gas anymore? Where does our fuel come from? So even if we decide to sit that out, what happens? 

MARLES: Well, if I can just finish where I was at before. The point I made in my main speech is that our continent is more relevant to great power contest now than it's ever been before. That is as much of a question in the here and now as is the building up of our defence capability. But we are building up that defence capability and to meet the questions that you've just put to me then, I do have a sense of confidence that we will have the defence force in place necessary to be able to deter any potential risks. 

UHLMANN: There was one question which came today, which was about certainty of industry and the Premier Peter Malinauskus did raise it. So what he wanted to know was whether or not there was going to be a comprehensive and chronologically organised plan for Osborne, so that they would have certainty for industry there. He put that challenge to the Australian Government today. Is that a challenge that you accept?

MARLES: Absolutely, and obviously we work very closely with Peter's government, and there will absolutely be certainty. And that certainty is really fundamental in terms of the Osborne Naval Shipyard. It's really important also in Western Australia, in terms of the development of the Henderson Defence Precinct. And all of that, I might say, is really important beyond both WA and South Australia. If we are going to build our future nuclear-powered submarines, which we most definitely will, we will need to engage in the entire nation’s industrial base. That does mean states like Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, all of those into the industrial bases across those states will also need to be engaged, and so the certainty that must be provided in planning is critically important for them as well. 

UHLMANN: One last thing, and thank you very much for your time today, but Prime Minister and Cabinet had an AUKUS division, it has cancelled that AUKUS division, are you aware of that? Are they? Are they doing this in some other way, what’s going on? 

MARLES: Well, I mean AUKUS in terms of our defence plan, is more than a division. 

UHLMANN: I mean, it is going to be a whole of government coordination. And that's PM&C. 

MARLES: I think there's a fair point to make there. We need whole of government buy-in. I believe we are getting whole of government buy-in. But all of that is a process that we will look at, but in terms of the architecture of defence, it is utterly central to all of what we're doing. And so it's more than a division, it is not all of the effort, but a significant part of the effort of Defence. 

UHLMANN: One final thing obviously, Israel has attacked Iran, nuclear weapons on your border. Do you see it as perfectly reasonable for Israel to try and take out that threat? 

MARLES: So I repeat the call that we made today that we are concerned about the escalation of the conflict that is going on now in the Middle East and we do believe it is really important that we see a focus, an emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy. 

UHLMANN: As the Ambassador said ‘words don’t stop warheads’. 

MARLES: Now, to be clear, we completely understand the threat that is represented by Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program as not just a threat to the Middle East, as a threat to the peace and stability of the world. The Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore a couple of weeks ago, the President Macron spoke very eloquently and forcefully about the threat that Iran's program represents. So we're under no illusions when we say that we do not want to see an escalation of what's going on to some broader conflict, but we're under no illusions of what the Iranian program represents. 

UHLMANN: Richard Marles, thank you very much.

ENDS