Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore: Q and A

SUBJECTS: Shangri-La Dialogue; non-proliferation; framework for cyber and AI; nuclear deterrence; AUKUS; Australia-United State Relationship; multilateralism; arms reduction 

DELEGATE: I just have one general question; years of maximum pressure fail to discourage North Korea from aggressively developing its nuclear weapons and military solutions are also unrealistic. So do you think a formal recognition of North Korea and the free integration into the global non-proliferation system can still change Pyongyang’s behaviour. Thank you. 

DELEGATE: My question is for the entire panel. We heard about the historical role of US extended nuclear deterrence as a tool of proliferation, and I wonder how credible the American nuclear umbrella looks from your capitals in the era of American tough love. Thank you. 

DELEGATE: My question goes to Deputy Prime Minister of Australia. As an ally of the United States, what changes do you envision in the Trump administration's non-proliferation policy, and what's your expectation of the future of AUKUS? Thank you.

DELEGATE: My question is for the Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, the region has been seeing the rapid and opaque expansion of nuclear arsenals and ballistic missile capability, particularly by an NPT recognized nuclear weapon states. Now China remains the only ballistic missile capable state in the region that refuses to join the Hague Code of Conduct, and there are many good reasons why the Chinese have refused, which include its non-binding nature and its exclusion of cruise missiles. Do you think these are fair, and would you be willing to revisit the Hague Code of Conduct to accommodate China's concerns? Thank you.

DELEGATE: Thank you very much. Well, I noted Richard's remarks that the arms control regime has collapsed, resulting in no regulation of the nuclear balance of power has called for more attention to getting to cyber and AI. Ruben saying the same thing about the importance of responsible use of AI in military affairs. Of course, during the Cold War, there was a very complex accounting system, as Bastian suggested, for measuring the nuclear balance of power, accountable warheads, delivery vehicles. If, for example, a missile was tested with ten warheads, every deployed missile was counted as having ten warheads, regardless of its actual load. So 90 per cent of the time in arms control negotiations were spent on the units of account and how to calculate balances. What on earth will be the units of account and the regulatory system around measuring AI, cyber and the like- are we anywhere near the beginning of calculating how to count these things, and therefore how to assess appropriate balances?

DR BASTIAN GIEGERICH, DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE, IISS: Richard, I'm just going to put you on notice, since you have, I think, the largest share of direct questions I'll ask you to go first in a minute. 

DELEGATE: My question is primarily for Deputy Prime Minister Marles and Minister Brekelmans, and it's about the proliferation of another dual use technology, which is spyware, cyber intrusive capabilities and other kinds of offensive cyber capabilities. While these products are obviously very important for national security and law enforcement, we have seen them being misused for repressive reasons by both state actors as well as non-state actors. Regulation (inaudible) remains very light. There are international arrangements like the power law process to address them. For the most part, I think a lot of states, including those that host a lot of spy ware companies, have not been taking this issue as seriously. How do your governments plan to ensure transparency and accountability in the deployment of these tools internationally? Thank you.

DELEGATE: My question is about Australia. How does Australia plan to cooperate in strengthening US nuclear deterrence further in this region? And what actions or commitments from the United States would make Australia feel that extended nuclear deterrence is credibly provided?

GIEGERICH: Thank you very much. So we'll take those that's a fair bunch, and Richard, we'll start with you. Then we'll go to Ruben Brekelmans, and then Mr. President will conclude this round of responses with you, and then we'll get a few more comments in. Richard, do you want to start addressing these?

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, RICHARD MARLES: So I'll try to do these as best I can. Perhaps, to start with North Korea on formal recognition, I guess, into the nuclear state- as a nuclear state. I mean, I think all of that is a concern. I fundamentally feel that what we have seen with North Korea and its pursuit of nuclear technology represents one of the single most destabilizing actions in terms of the whole proliferation regime, if there is ultimately a recognition that in any respect that that is valid, then what that will lead to, I think, as President Macron said last night, in respect of Iran, is a very dangerous circumstance indeed. 

A couple of questions went to the US nuclear deterrence, and the credibility of that. As I said in my opening remarks, that nuclear- the US nuclear extended deterrence, is actually a contributor to global stability within the framework of what we have under the NPT. And it remains an important feature of maintaining stability in the world, and that is certainly how we see it. 

John you raised the question about the- and it was a really good question, and there was also one from Indonesia- you raised a question in relation to AI, it was also a really good question in relation to the relation to offensive cyber, both of which kind of had the same theme of; when we look back at the period of nuclear arms control, accounting was a key part of it. So how does that work in cyber? How does that work in AI? Excellent questions. And the way I think you put it in the best argument was at the beginning of that. I think we are at the beginning of it. I mean, it is a really good question, obviously, I don't have all the answers, but I think it's important that we not look at that as seen, as being seen to be an insurmountable challenge, and a path down which there is no (inaudible). The former British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak hosted a conference in- actually at Bletchley Park- I'm going to start this around the end of 2023- which was really looking at the beginnings of how you might seek to provide global norms in respect of the development of AI. And I think there were ideas in relation to all of that, which do give us the beginnings of how you could establish a framework to shape the way in which AI is used, and ultimately ensure that there are guardrails in terms of how it is used in a military context. And I think that is a good example of the beginnings of an effort to try and walk down that path. Again, in respect of spy ware and offensive opportunities, there are opportunities there to do that as well. 

Finally, there was from China a question in relation to the future AUKUS. AUKUS in respect of it providing Australia with an ability to acquire a nuclear powered submarine capability is continuing to proceed and continuing to proceed on course, and both- well the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia all share the vision and the belief that Australia having a capable, long range submarine capability is important in terms of contributing to the balance, the stability of the Indo Pacific, ultimately the collective security of the region in which we all live. I think, in the context of the discussion that we're having today, and again, as I said in my opening remarks, in walking down that path as a non-nuclear arms country, we are doing so with the highest safeguard standards, and in cooperation with the IAEA to ensure that all that we do in relation to AUKUS is compliant with our obligations under the NPT. And beyond that, we've made clear that the commitments we make not only through the NPT, but through the Treaty of Rarotonga, which is around having a nuclear arms free Pacific, and we are a signatory to that, that we will maintain our obligations in respect of that in our pursuit of a long range submarine capability.

Responses from Dr José Ramos-Horta, President, Timor-Leste and Ruben Brekelmans, Minister of Defence, Netherlands omitted.

DELEGATE: I would like to direct my question to the Minister of Defence of Netherland, and Minister of Defence of Australia. Minister Brekelmans mentioned about the global security architecture post-cold war, which saw proliferation of treaties, international law and liberal value and norm that shaped the global order that we are living in today. And Deputy Prime Minister Marles also specifically highlighted the importance of balance of power and risk of imbalance of power, especially when it comes to nuclear weapon. My question to the two defence ministers is that now that with the war in Europe and tension and flash point in the Indo Pacific, what went wrong in the past 30 years that contribute to the conflict and tension today? And in your view, what were the key lesson learned from the past 30 years that Europe and Indo Pacific need to learn to stabilize regional and global order moving forward. Thank you.

DELEGATE: My question is, for all of the speakers. In managing proliferation risks, there is increasingly a preference for mini-lateral and bilateral approaches, and although this may be more efficient, it often excludes the interests and concerns of smaller countries who are often left at the periphery of major power competition. My question is, what are the prospects of multilateralism today, and are there any specific mechanisms that we should be focusing on?

DELEGATE: I'm a researcher at Boston College. So I have a question about the danger of arms control. There are a lot of concern around the Asia Pacific right now that if you sign an arm control or the US sign in arm control with China or with Russia that can be seen as a measure of abandonment of allies. Basically that China or Russia, they can exploit those arms control to limit the ability of the US to defend its allies. And obviously that a lot of these allies and partners of the US, they are really, really worried about that. So how do you recommend the US or other country in the region reassure the allies that arms control is a good thing and it's not just simply a measure to withdraw from the region? Thank you so much.

DELEGATE: I'm encouraged by the mention of the responsible AI in a military domain summit or AI Summit. I work for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research- so UNIDIR, and we've been fervent supporters, including through the organizations of regional consultations to support REAIM just last week for Asia Pacific in Seoul. So I have two sort of- two part questions. So first is, considering that AI is bringing forth a lot of questions around proliferation due to its general purpose and nature, and as mentioned earlier, but also intangible and its risk into proliferating into the hands of non-state armed groups. What will be the role of industries in preventing the proliferation of such technologies? Because I know that they are taking part of REAIM Summit, for example. But beyond that, could we perhaps look into voluntary commitments by industries and non-state stakeholders? And then second is within regards to the proliferation of these technologies and non-proliferation efforts, we also must take into account the fact that these technologies also bring a lot of opportunities for smaller countries. And so how can we balance- strike the right balance between leveraging the opportunities these technologies may offer for international peace and security for smaller countries, while at the same time preventing proliferation into non-state arms groups. Thank you.

DELEAGTE: My question is for President Horta, although it's the biggest ongoing crisis in the region, the war in Myanmar remains relatively low on the list of global priorities, perhaps because the violence is confined to the country itself, at least for now. But as we've seen, Myanmar has emerged as the epicentre of a billion dollar scam industry, as well as other transnational threats like human trafficking and narcotics that are afflicting the region. My question is, how do we prevent global leaders from ignoring certain security issues at their own peril? Thank you.

DELEAGTE: My question is also to President Ramos-Horta. So as a Nobel Peace laureate, what's your opinion about the concept of deterrence through enhancing military capabilities? Because ultimately that could also mean armed proliferation. Is it paradoxical to the concept of peace at all, especially when we're seeing an erosion in rules based world order? Thank you.

DELEAGTE: To the whole panel, where we're seeing a generational shift in our societal relationship with technology, information and security, from AI generated content, cyber enabled information operations and disinformation campaigns, given the role that perception plays in shaping our understanding of threats and how we respond to them, I'm curious to understand how your countries are preparing to manage such a contentious information environment, and whether there are any safeguards that you are looking to implement that might help your governments and militaries better manage such an environment? Thank you.

GIEGERICH: Thank you very much. So let's turn to these questions. Mr President, I'm going to turn to you first, perhaps to answer the two points that were put to you directly. There was the question using Myanmar as an example, which has become the epicentre of a particular kind of threat linked to the scam industry, human trafficking, narcotics. How do we make sure we don't we don't overlook that challenge as leaders are focused on other global issues? And then the question addressed to you as a Noble Peace laureate, how do you think about the relationship between deterrence and peace? 

Responses from Dr José Ramos-Horta, President, Timor-Leste and Ruben Brekelmans, Minister of Defence, Netherlands omitted.

MARLES: Thank you. I'm going to begin with a very good question from IISS India around how we do manage restraint and controls in AI- in nuclear technology, but in the context of social media, the internet, disinformation, and what I thought was a beautifully used phrase, which I'm going to borrow now and adopt, which is ‘a contentious information environment’, I think that sums things up greatly. When I look at my children, my teenagers, absorbing information from Tiktok, and I look at what that information is, using ChatGPT to work out how they can answer particular questions and then engage in social media and then do their own homework. Ultimately, I have to say I just have a profound sense of feeling both confused and old, but I'm very well aware that none of those are particularly constructive feelings in terms of moving forward. But I do genuinely think that the information environment in which people are growing up in today is genuinely one of the biggest challenges that we face, and it is in large measure, very unregulated. And I think there is obviously great advantages associated with it, and it has produced great good, but there is also great harm that can come from it, and it is important to think about what is appropriate regulation in its context. I don't have all the answers, but one thing that we have done in Australia is to limit the use of social media for kids under the age of 16, which is to start the conversation about the fact that there does need to be some responsible- or limits around how people engage in this environment so that people are at least are in a position to learn how to discern what information they ultimately absorb. And I think that is a foundational question in terms of how we move forward in relation to all of these questions, because, as you rightly said, perception is very much at the heart of how a lot of these steps are taken. 

In respect of AI, I think a couple of really good points. It is absolutely right that as we establish global norms, we have to be thinking about industry and the private sector. This is not like the development of nuclear technology, which was essentially done by state actors in its early days. This is something which has industry very much at its heart, and so it needs to be part of how we conceive of the constraints that are placed around the application of this technology. But you also made the point that there are a whole lot of benefits that come from AI- of course there are. And in that sense, I think there is an equivalence with nuclear technology- I mean, you just look at nuclear medicine, for example. For example, a whole lot of really good things have come for humanity from understanding that science. And really at the heart of these constraints and restraints, is about ensuring that the science is ultimately developed in the favour of humanity and not against it. 

In relation to the question of multilateralism and unilateralism, I mean, a couple of things to say. I think mini-lateralism is fine. There are lots of mini-laterals around which really do play an enormously significant role in providing for the stability and the security of the world. And they don't have to be exclusive in nature. I think it's about how mini-laterals go about their business. Australia is not a member of ASEAN, but we are deeply engaged by ASEAN, and a coherent Southeast Asia under the banner of ASEAN is deeply in Australia's national interest. And so you will not see a bigger supporter of the idea of ASEAN centrality than Australia, even though we are not a member of that organization. But it is an organization that we engage with really significantly, and it is very central to how we see the world. And I think it is a model for how mini-lateralism can operate. Multilateralism clearly has a very significant role to play. I mean, those global norms and trees which aspire, at least, to have universal membership, are fundamental to underpinning a global rules based order. You know, the NPT has that aspiration, and that is a perfect example. 

There was the question around, how do we deal with arms reduction and not give rise to a sense that people are being abandoned? I think Ruben answered this perfectly. At the end of the day, this is a question of whether or not there is the trust around which enables arms reduction to occur. I think, to be clear, all of our advocacy is about an American engagement, for example, in the Indo Pacific, I spoke about that in my opening remarks. We want the US very much engaged in this region. US extended nuclear deterrence means that a country like Australia doesn't need to think about going down those paths. Any form of arms control can only happen if there is strategic trust which enables that to occur. 

And that leads to the final question, which was in fact the first, around what's gone wrong in the last 30 years? José talked about the fact that he thought it was fine to have deterrence coupled with dialogue, I like that- the way in which that is put. I was going to say we need balance- or what's gone wrong is a failure of balance and strategic transparency. I actually think those two things are pretty much the same. We need to have balance in the world, but there needs to be the dialogue and the openness in terms of why countries have military capability, which enables there to be a strategic transparency and reassurance around the having of those arms. And that is the basis upon which you will have peace and ultimately walk down a path of arms restraint. 

GIEGERICH: Richard, thank you very much. That concludes.

ENDS