The Hon. Peter Reith, MP

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30 Sep 2001
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  Appendix A

Ministerial Paper

 

Coastal Surveillance and Protection:

a "US-Style" Coast Guard or

the Australian Coastwatch?

 

Issued by the Hon Peter Reith MP

Minister for Defence

 

 

 

October 2001

 

 

 

 

 

 

Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Michael Palmer:

"My unqualified experience in looking at arrangements in countries where there are coastguard type arrangements … and I look particularly at the United States and the United Kingdom – is that I would gain no comfort at all from those arrangements. Those arrangements have caused a division through the investigative focus and it has caused competition between investigative agencies in a very counterproductive way. I can say, from conversations with my United Kingdom counterparts, that from a law enforcement perspective they would give their right arm to have arrangements similar to those which exist in Australia." (Testimony to JCPAA, 30/01/01)

 

 

 

 

In his 1984 study Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance and Protection Arrangements – A Review, Mr Beazley wrote the following.

"I have examined in some detail options for creating a dedicated force, including elements of the Defence Force additional to those already committed to surveillance and response … I am less convinced that they would lead to a system that would better counter the traffic in narcotics and sustain the kind of littoral surveillance evidently necessary for other purposes as well … to isolate this activity from the rest of Defence would lose the perceived advantages of the association."

 

 

Table of Contents

Page

Executive Summary 4

Introduction 7

Labor’s January 2000 Policy Announcement 7

The Timing of Labor’s Policy 8

The Real Reason for the Labor Policy 9

The Real Reason for the United States Arrangements 12

Current Arrangements 14

Effectiveness of Current Arrangements 15

Law Enforcement Agency Opinion 18

Putative Effectiveness of Labor’s Proposals 20

Cost of the 2000 ALP Policy 21

    1. International Comparisons 22
    2. Previous Estimates by Australian Governments 23
    3. Capital Required to Offset Transfers of Assets

Staff and Infrastructure 23

Damage to the Australian Defence Force 27

Lessons from the US and Other Overseas Operations 31

Legislative Implications 33

Labor’s Shallow Reasons for its Policy 35

Symbolism 35

Budget-Slashing Efficiencies 37

Commitment to Darwin Voters 37

Conclusions 39

 

Executive Summary

 

 

 

 

Introduction

At 7:45pm on the 13th of April, forty-one Australian Defence Force personnel boarded a trawler – the South Tomi - after a chase across the Southern Ocean from Australia to Africa. The vessel had been initially spotted by an Australian Fisheries ship off the coast of Heard Island, around 2000 nautical miles south-west of Fremantle. The cargo on the Togo-registered vessel included endangered Patagonian toothfish, illegally caught within Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

The Australian Fisheries vessel pursued the poachers for 10 days across 2000 nautical miles towards South Africa. While the Fisheries vessel was in ‘hot pursuit’, about forty Australian Defence personnel flew to South Africa, to intercept the illegal fishermen at the other end. The ADF contingent embarked on a South African survey vessel and set out to sea accompanied by a patrol boat. Shots were fired across the bow when the South Tomi refused to stop. The Australians boarded the vessel, led by armed boarding party. A steaming party of 25 RAN seamen was assigned to sail the vessel back to Fremantle.

Thanks to the cooperation of the South African National Defence Force, and the determined efforts of Australia’s defence personnel, the South Tomi’s crew can now be prosecuted under Australian law and the illegal fishing vessel can be confiscated. This case is a testament to the effectiveness of Australia’s coastal surveillance and protection arrangements. It is an operation that would have been impossible without the high level links that exist between the respective Defence Forces of Australia and South Africa.

Most importantly, this incident is an example of the highly coordinated action that is possible between the Australian civil and defence authorities, under the aegis of Coastwatch’s co-operative arrangements.

Labor’s January 2000 Policy Announcement

On 23 January 2000, Kim Beazley launched a 5 page policy document called Labor's Framework for an Australian Coast Guard. The Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial described the brief paper as "the Federal Labor Party’s most detailed policy statement since the 1998 election." (25/1/00)

Mr Beazley and his own spokesman have contradicted each other, trying to explain their policy. In The Australian newspaper, Mr Beazley said;

"Establish a coast guard … We need a coherent constabulary effort that, in wartime, would be ancillary to the defence forces and, in peacetime, would provide opportunities for young naval officers, in particular, to receive excellent command training." (29/12/00)

Opposition Defence Spokesman Dr Stephen Martin has added some differing details to this already self-contradicting policy.

"Opposition defence spokesman Stephen Martin said … A coast guard would free navy personnel to ease its staff shortage." (West Australian 10/4/01)

Labor’s various statements attempting to explain the proposal are as riddled with self-contradiction and missing logic as the full policy document itself.

This Coast Guard "policy" is as muddled as the kind of prolix rhetoric which Mr Beazley engages in during ad-lib moments. One would hope that Mr Beazley had not dictated the Coast Guard policy aloud in a stream-of-consciousness. This Ministerial Paper examines the Labor proposal against considerations that are integral to the management of Australia’s coastal defence and surveillance operations.

This paper also redresses Labor’s failure to cost its policy, by providing several expert assessments of how much this package will take from taxpayers’ pockets. If Labor wishes to begin its series of pre-election policy announcements by making unfunded promises, then the government is prepared to set straight what the costs will be.

The Timing of Labor’s Policy

In 1984, as the then Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley chaired and co-authored a study titled Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance and Protection Arrangements – A Review. His study concluded that setting up a Coast Guard was neither an efficient nor cost-effective policy option. Subsequently when Mr Beazley was Defence Minister, he continued to see no need for a Coast Guard.

But in January 2000 the Federal Labor Opposition proposed that the case was over-whelming for Australia to re-badge Coastwatch as a "Coast Guard". Mr Beazley claims that the Coast Guard policy is an idea whose time has suddenly arrived. He wrote that the problems of drugs, quarantine and immigration are relatively recent phenomena.

"We have seen a surge in illicit drug imports into Australia and a resumption of the threat of substantial illegal immigration that had largely petered out during the 1980s. Quarantine and health problems are rampant in the regions around us." [Emphasis added.] (The Australian 29/12/00)

But, these problems are not recent phenomena. It was in the 1970s that each of these problems came strongly into focus for policy-makers. According to the Australian Customs Service, incursions by foreign fishing vessels first increased markedly in 1973 and 1974. Indonesian fishing vessels were also regularly landing along the Kimberley coast, bringing possible quarantine risks. In 1976, the first wave of Vietnamese boat people landed in Darwin. Just a year later, the Government announced its intention to declare a 200 nautical mile Australian Fishing Zone around the continent.

It is true that since the mid 1990s, there have been notable increases in the number of illegal immigrants and a rise in drug trafficking. However, contrary to what Mr Beazley implies, these statistics do not entail a recent disruption in historic trends. In 1993 there was a review of Coastwatch’s operations. This was in response to a 300% increase in the demand on Coastwatch over the five preceding years. According to Customs, in the early 1990s when Labor was still in government, "the focus of Coastwatch clients had widened, from a predominantly northern outlook, to encompass the whole of the Australian coastline and its offshore zones. In addition, new threats had emerged. People smuggling and child abduction and an increase in illegal drug importation warranted a review of the Concept of Operations."

Even after launching its Coast Guard policy, Labor has not been totally consistent in its claim that there is a sudden need for a major policy re-arrangement. In an earlier media interview, Mr Beazley was more measured about the putative need to abandon existing arrangements.

"We need a new response for new circumstances, and while its always a marginal decision whether you go on with existing arrangements or go to a fully dedicated Coast Guard, the realities have tipped it to the Coast Guard." (NT News 24/1/00)

Since the government has exposed how expensive Labor’s policy for a Coast Guard will be, its spokesmen have been back-pedalling about whether there is an immigration crisis or a surge in illicit drugs. In its dissenting report to the recent Parliamentary Committee into Coastwatch, Labor MPs penned the following.

"Presently we face a comparatively low level of threat – though significant in terms of the cost to deal with it relative to the small size of our population. The remote environment in which that low level threat is projected toward Australia means that the focus is on achieving cost effective surveillance." (JCPAA, Review of Coastwatch, p. 204)

The Real Reason for the Labor Policy

Labor’s Coast Guard policy was announced at a time when it was under considerable pressure to announce policy. It had then gone for 15 months without releasing a single post-election policy document in any portfolio.

Kim Beazley’s official policy announcement of 23 January 2000 was pre-empted by his impatient Shadow Customs Spokesman, Duncan Kerr. Mr Kerr revealed at least four times that Labor would create a Coast Guard, before Kim Beazley finally relented and pretended that he was announcing a Coast Guard policy for the first time. Three months before Kim Beazley acceded to public demand for some policy, Duncan Kerr began making his unilateral announcements about Labor’s Coast Guard policy.

It is likely that the behind-the-scenes drafting of the Labor policy began in reaction to a Coalition government study of existing Coastwatch operations which reported six months earlier. On 12 April 1999, the Prime Minister announced the establishment of a Prime Ministerial Task Force, headed by the Secretary of his department, to conduct a thorough review and make recommendations on strengthening coastal surveillance procedures and systems. Membership of the Task Force included the Chief of the Defence Force, the Secretary of the Department of Defence, the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the CEO of the Australian Customs Service, the Director General of the Office of National Assessments, and the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. In June the Task Force tabled its findings, proposing several initiatives to upgrade coastal policing.

The taskforce considered and rejected proposals for a US-style Coast Guard.

"The Task Force does not consider that the threats involved justify the considerable additional expenditure of establishing a coast guard, nor would a coast guard in itself solve the problem of effective coordination. The US Coast Guard with an annual budget of around US$4 billion still finds it necessary to operate in tandem with other agencies. Coastwatch, with its links to Customs, Defence and other assets already provides an adequate structure to conduct the coastal surveillance function. The measures and additional resources recommended in this report will improve Coastwatch’s ability to perform that function without the need for large-scale structural and administrative change." [Para 29]

The Federal Government’s response was to fully accept and fund all 18 recommendations of the Task Force. On 27 June 1999, the Prime Minister announced a four year program of initiatives worth $124 million. New resources included marine and aircraft crews, new aircraft, and increased staff. The government also established a new National Surveillance Centre in Canberra which facilitates a new analytical role for Coastwatch, supported by electronic systems from a range of government agencies, including Defence. The National Surveillance Centre became operational on 26 January 2000, just three days after Labor’s announcement of its Coast Guard policy. Labor’s sketchy policy document not only failed to match the detail of government initiatives already underway, but its promise of a new national surveillance centre even suggested ignorance of the recent developments.

Almost two years after the opening of the National Surveillance Centre, Kim Beazley is still misleading the public about its existence and repeating his promise to re-invent the centre.

"Coastwatch has not developed an adequate intelligence collection and management system … Creating a focal point … will make it easier to fuse the data … into one maritime picture, which will be available to the Coast Guard through highly-secure, high-speed information systems … data bases can be made available in one place … At present this capability does not exist." (Hansard, 24/9/01)

Although Labor’s policy may have been a reaction to the 1999 Prime Ministerial Task Force, it was evident that Labor had not thoroughly examined the Task Force’s report. The Task Force had pointed out that in recent years, illegal immigration by air far exceeded illegal boat arrivals, and some illegal boat arrivals begin their journey with a plane flight. For example in the financial year 1997-98, 91% of illegal migrants came by air. Furthermore, illegal "overstayers" (who arrive with valid visas) usually arrive by air. Although this information suggests that airport resources should be a part of any balanced response, the Labor policy was strangely pitched solely at surveillance of sea-borne vessels.

The Labor policy makes general statements about the future need to replace the Fremantle Class Patrol Boats, while glossing over aerial surveillance capability in a single con-committal sentence that says that current arrangements will continue "initially". This transitional arrangement is contradicted by the ultimate objective of the policy: to consolidate existing resources under the control of a single agency labelled a "Coast Guard". The hourly cost of a RAAF Orion aircraft is ten times that of a Coastwatch Dash 8 aircraft. If some Orions were to move under a Coast Guard’s control, then there would be significant additional funding requirements to duplicate the Defence capability. Yet the Labor policy is deliberately unclear about which assets its Coast Guard would really subsume, or how genuinely committed a Labor government would be to ending current contracting-out arrangements. This has all the hallmarks of a rushed and reactive policy document.

In his 1984 paper on coastal surveillance, Mr Beazley wrote that he was strongly in support of the contracting-out approach.

"It is clear that the national surveillance and protection system serves to one extent or another a wide and diverse range of Ministerial responsibilities, both Commonwealth and State. Adjustments to the balance of effort cannot be to the detriment of those responsibilities … there are a number of difficulties – related primarily to Ministerial responsibility - that need to be accommodated, and that the present system’s "user pays" procedure and its use of externally-managed equipment resources provide constant and valuable tests on efficiency." [paras 5, 8]

The Labor policy proposes an inappropriate framework for the use of lethal force by civilian vessels. According to the policy "The Coast Guard will complement the Royal Australian Navy in time of conflict … The Act establishing the Australian Coast Guard will authorise Coast Guard vessels to undertake combat duty when placed under ADF command." The Prime Ministerial Task Force noted that "Arming Customs vessels themselves is not supported, as it raises complicated legal issues and cuts across the actions and responsibilities of the Australian Defence Force. The addition of mounted guns to Customs vessels would also involve extensive modifications." The Labor policy includes no additional funds to pay for the wartime combat capability which it proposes. The Customs fleet of Bay Class vessels are not armed with deck-mounted guns, and would require expensive alterations in order to meet the combat readiness required under the Labor policy.

While the Labor policy may have been timed as a reaction to the Prime Ministerial Task Force report, or perhaps as an attempt to upstage by three days the opening of the new National Surveillance Centre, Labor’s policy draftsmen seemed to be little aware of the content in the previous studies into coastal surveillance operations.

Although Labor promotes its policy as a fresh approach, it has in its haste, turned to an inappropriate and old-fashioned US model (a system signed into law during World War I by President Woodrow Wilson on 28 January 1915).

The Real Reason for the United States Arrangements

The American Coast Guard has been the inspiration and the prototype that Labor seeks to replicate. Mr Beazley has explicitly revealed that: "Stephen Martin has visited Coast Guard establishments in the United States. And, it must be said, they are something of a model for us for the things that we are proposing here today. Duncan [Kerr] has talked at length to law enforcement officials in the United States." (23/12/00) [Emphasis added]

Stephen Martin and Duncan Kerr have not done their homework. They are wrong to assume that the US Coast Guard was designed for reasons of either effectiveness or efficiency. The real reason for the establishment of the American Coast Guard is based upon a historical quirk in American constitutional law and political history.

In 1878, following the American Civil War, Congress passed a piece of legislation called the Posse Comitatus Act. This criminal law statute was in response to Southern anger about the presence of federal Union soldiers, who were employed to enforce civil laws in the defeated Southern states. This law forbade the use of the military in the enforcement of civilian law and made necessary the eventual creation of a Coast Guard. This law is described in one law review article as "A century-old relic of the nation’s failed experiment with Radical Reconstruction." (31 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 445 (1990))

Near the end of his tenure, President Clinton established an "Interagency Taskforce on the Roles and Missions of the United States Coast Guard". This taskforce was directed to make recommendations on the appropriate roles and missions for the Coast Guard through to the year 2020. In its conclusions the taskforce made clear that the Navy could take over the Coast Guard’s function, but was only prevented from doing so by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

"Other than the U.S. Navy, no other agency other than the Coast Guard has the operational assets to enforce immigration laws at sea. … [Then it comments on drug interdiction:] While the Navy has vessels and aircraft with operational capability to carry out this mission, posse comitatus restrictions prohibit DOD from exercising law enforcement authority over U.S. citizens." (The US Coast Guard of the 21st Century, 2000)

In the test case of United States v Walden 416 U.S. 983 (1974), the Federal Court showed its willingness to find a violation of the Act by Navy personnel. In 1981, the escalation of drug smuggling had prompted Congress to amend the Posse Comitatus Act to strengthen the military’s legal authority to fight the drug trade. The amendments authorised the armed services to provide civilian authorities with equipment, intelligence, facilities, training and advice (10 U.S.C. § 374 (1982)). Thereafter the Navy was able to host Coast Guard boarding parties on its vessels in the high seas, and has been providing air surveillance of sea lanes for Coast Guard.

Although Navy personnel are prevented from exercising the powers of arrest, search or seizure, their assets and crews are increasingly and routinely annexing functions once performed by Coast Guard.

"Indeed, despite the presence of Coast Guard personnel aboard the Navy ships, Navy servicemen do much of the detecting and tracking of suspects, Navy ships transport the boarding team to its destination, carry the Coast Guardsmen to the vessel to be boarded in a Navy launch, provide vital communications services and ‘back up’ security during the boarding, and – if a seizure or arrest is made – navy ships transport, guard and care for the prisoners, and tow or escort the seized vessel and evidence to a United States port for later prosecution." (Coast Guard Lieutenant C. Abel, 31 Wm and Mary. Rev. 445 (1990)).

In 1989, Congress designated the Department of Defense as the "single lead agency" in the task of drug interdiction.

"The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States." (National Defense Authorization Act, codified as amended 10 U.S.C. § 124(a) (1994)).

Since World War II, the number of Coast Guard personnel has stayed almost steady -around 37,000. Over that time, maritime activity has increased significantly and the United States population has expanded by over 100 million. Even under the Reagan Administration, where Department of Defense spending burgeoned, the Coast Guard budget fell by $500 million from 1982 to 1988 (Budget in Brief, Commandant’s Bulletin, 25/2/88 in 31 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 445).

Whereas the Australian Labor Party thinks it is necessary to take away RAN assets and create a new bureaucracy based on a United States model; American Congressional leaders have peen pushing in the opposite direction – for the Navy to take over all Coast Guard functions. On at least two occasions before the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act and five times subsequently, there have been Congressional initiatives to abolish the Coast Guard (1843, 1859, 1889, 1912, 1919 and 1933). Subsequently, law-makers have been more incremental in their efforts to allow the Navy to take on Coast Guard tasks. In recent decades Coast Guard spending has been either stagnant, in decline, as the Navy appropriately takes over its role.

President Clinton’s Taskforce made clear that the only reason that the Coast Guard still exists is because of the Posse Comitatus Act. This legislation is the product of post-Civil War history, Southern distrust of the victorious Union soldiers and a distinctly North American "libertarian paranoia" about law enforcement by the military.

The 1878 Act has little to do with effective government arrangements or bureaucratic efficiency. The Australian Labor Party is calling for bureaucratic duplication, without fully understanding the quirky origins of the foreign system that they seek to emulate.

Current Arrangements

Prime Minister’s Task Force into Coastal Surveillance in 1999 retained the current arrangements run by Coastwatch, a Division of Customs. The PM’s review resulted in a $124 million boost for Coastwatch, which ensured that there would be adequate resources to meet future demands for maritime surveillance and response.

Coastwatch has operated for some 12 years, providing operational control of coastal surveillance under one agency. Coastwatch has a fleet of 15 fixed wing and two rotary wing aircraft. Coastwatch also has access to the 1,200 seas days of patrols by the Bay Class Fleet of Customs vessels (recently increased), 1,800 RAN patrol boat sea days, and 250 hours of RAAF P3C Orion flights each year. In practice, assistance is very close to or exceeds these targets. Actual achievement in financial year 98/99 was 1,868 patrol boat days and 401 flying hours. For the current financial year until 1 April, the RAN has provided 1206 patrol boat days and the RAAF has provided 178 flying hours.

In the 2000-01 year, Coastwatch anticipates that it will attain a total 19,750 hours of fixed and rotary wing flying time. The final figure may vary slightly, depending on the changing client requirements during the year and the mix of airframe hours that need to be flown in response. The 19,750 hours are broken down as follows.

During 2000 the Navy boarded more than 270 foreign fishing vessels. Sixty six of those were subsequently escorted to port. In that time, 1,756 unlawful persons were escorted to mainland ports. From the start of this year until mid-April, the Navy has boarded 36 foreign fishing vessels and subsequently apprehended 16 vessels.

The cost of civil maritime surveillance and response managed by Coastwatch is $198 million a year, which includes as its largest component the Defence contribution of $130 million. Coastwatch utilises a staff of around 60 officers, around 150 contractors, and, on average, 120 ADF personnel contributing to Coastwatch operations –including four permanently assigned Defence officers.

However, if Australia only had a "single-responsible agency", as Labor intends, then the wider resources currently provided by the ADF would be precluded. Labor’s single agency policy is simplistic and takes no account of the occasional need for surge capacity. In its dissenting report to the JCPAA (Parliamentary Committee), Labor MPs denied that specialist military assets were often the best equipment for coastal surveillance and interdiction.

"Military assets such as maritime patrol aircraft are optimised for warfare not civilian surveillance and are too expensive to cost effectively deploy … Civil maritime surveillance and response is by definition a non-military function."

This Labor claim firstly overlooks the dangers present in certain drug interdiction operations. It secondly ignores the occasional need for specialist surveillance resources. The Australian Defence Forces are currently able to provide surge capacity to assist with unusual demands upon Coastwatch or its client agencies. For instance, in anticipation of an exceptionally large wave of unauthorised boat arrivals in September 2001 via international waters between the Indonesian archipelago and Australia, the ADF deployed a range of specialist assets (three frigates with Sea Hawk s70B Helicopters embarked; patrol boat and supply ship support; and four P3 Orion Aircraft). In another example, in 1977 as Vietnam boat arrivals were increasing, there was a six month trial surveillance program using RAAF Dakota and RAN Tracker aircraft over the waters between Darwin and Broome.

Further, the Labor Policy would spell an end to routine "piggy-back" use of Defence assets, outside its minimum patrol commitments, in furtherance of Coastwatch operations. For example, Northern Command occasionally takes advantage of fleet concentrations during Defence exercises, to monitor important airspace for Coastwatch. One two-week monitoring exercise was able to identify all bar one aircraft track as a legitimate movement (JCPAA Report, pp. 115-6).

Coastwatch’s interception rate has increased from 73.8% of all suspected illegal vessels attempting to enter Australia in 1998-99 to an impressive 96% of vessels intercepted in 2000-01. In terms of people entering illegally - last financial year Coastwatch achieved a detention rate of 98.6% of all Suspected Unlawful Non-Citizens (SUNCs). Labor’s Coast Guard policy will do nothing to match or maintain these current high interception rates. Labor’s plan for a new bureaucracy is a merely intended as a scheme to serve bureaucratic interests, not to get improved results.

Effectiveness of Current Arrangements

Throughout its history, Coastwatch has been responsive to changing client needs. Labor’s current Defence spokesman, Dr Stephen Martin, chaired a parliamentary committee that approved of Coastwatch’s performance in 1990. Dr Martin’s committee reported in positive terms on the arrangement which it now proposes to abolish.

"Satisfaction among major client agencies is at a high level … In the course of its visits to Darwin and Broome the Committee was able to meet informally with many representatives of client agencies. Favourable reports of satisfaction with Coastwatch were received." (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, First Report on an Inquiry into Aspects of the Australian Customs Service, pp. xvi, 40.)

The client-driven nature of Coastwatch ensures that its operations are not distorted excessively towards any one single problem, or one single client. Coastwatch does not determine threat areas, nor does it presume to know client’s surveillance interests. The threat assessments of all clients is translated by Coastwatch into a balanced schedule of surveillance outcomes.

However the Labor approach of siphoning manpower and assets away from the client agencies, placing these resources underneath the control of the one central bureaucracy, will create a risk that operations may become biased against some priority area: be it narcotics, illegal fishing, quarantine, illegal immigration, environment, maritime safety, customs or police operations. The present structure between Coastwatch and its clients ensures that there is an ongoing and healthy debate about the wisest use of the resources available. The transparent decision-making involves regular consultation and reporting to all clients, and the National Surveillance Centre brings new capabilities to ensure that risk assessments are well measured.

Where urgent tactical tasks are required by one agency, precluding scheduled surveillance that was intended for strategic tasks, Coastwatch endeavours to redress the deficiency within the strategic program. According to Coastwatch, this is achieved either by using the original asset on its return from the tactical operation, or by alternative Coastwatch assets, or through ad-hoc charter aircraft if required. In 1998-99, the ratio of strategic and tactical flying was around 80% and 20% respectively. In such circumstances where some sacrifice of strategic tasks is always inevitable, it is preferable to have an arrangement that allows input from a range of clients. By contrast the Labor policy to centralise decisions within a single body might bias operations away from some priorities. Currently each client agency is an advocate for competing priorities, but the Labor policy is designed to cut these client agencies out entirely from operational planning and tasking.

Subsequent to the recommendations of the Prime Minister’s Task Force, several changes were made to strengthen the independence of Coastwatch, to ensure that it would not be seen to be too close to the Border Division of Customs. These arrangements ensure that there is a separation of interests between the Customs Marine Fleet (an asset provider) and the Border Operations (a client). Coastwatch was separated from the Border Division, and now reports directly to the CEO of Customs. Furthermore a serving Defence Rear Admiral was appointed as Director-General of Coastwatch, bringing someone from outside Customs to head the Coastwatch program.

The Australian Coastwatch arrangement has had a history of incremental evolution. The latest changes by the Howard government ensure that it has a strong responsiveness to client needs, as well as ensuring that the latest technology is utilised to pool information between all interested parties. By contrast, the US system is one that does not promote a similar level of agency cooperation. The following observations were recently made by the Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Michael Palmer:

"My unqualified experience in looking at arrangements in countries where there are coastguard type arrangements … and I look particularly at the United States and the United Kingdom – is that I would gain no comfort at all from those arrangements. Those arrangements have caused a division through the investigative focus and it has caused competition between investigative agencies in a very counterproductive way. I can say, from conversations with my United Kingdom counterparts, that from a law enforcement perspective they would give their right arm to have arrangements similar to those which exist in Australia." (Testimony to JCPAA, 30/01/01)

This view is echoed by the CEO of Customs, Mr Lionel Woodward:

"If you look at the US experience … There is a possibility of competition rather than complementarity in that and, frankly, duplication of resources." (Testimony to JCPAA, 30/01/01)

One navigator who has worked with Coastwatch, and who has had a placement with the US Coast Guard, made the following observation about the American waste and lack of agency cooperation.

"I was very disappointed to find in the US Coast Guard that during an exercise there might be up to seven different agencies all competing to make the hit, because they get rewarded. In fact, they would at times, deliberately oust the other group so that they could profit from the hit. You can count them any time you like: US Customs, state police, the federal police, tobacco agencies – up to seven different agencies all doing similar work." (Mr Douglas Mason, Testimony to JCPAA, 18/08/00)

In the 1990 parliamentary committee inquiry into Customs, which he chaired, Dr Martin boasted about the level of coordination achieved by Coastwatch, which was to the particular benefit of smaller agencies which could not afford to mount an operation alone in a competitive environment.

"The ANPWS [Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service] reported that coordination of coastal surveillance and protection activities through Coastwatch has been of great benefit to organisations such as itself, by enabling it to participate in and gather information from multi tasking operations which would be prohibitively expensive for it to mount alone. It therefore ‘strongly supports the continuation of Coastwatch operations in their present form’." (SCFPA, First Report on an Inquiry into Aspects of the Australian Customs Service, p.41)

The Australian arrangement is not only superior from a client’s viewpoint. The contracting of various assets also ensures that those undertaking central coordination can use their best professional judgement to choose the optimal assets, without being wedded to inflexible arrangements. The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit provided a taxpayers perspective on why present arrangements are highly effective and flexible for meeting changing demands.

"[T]here would be an incentive to contractors to provide value for money especially when there is no guaranteed renewal of the contract. … Coastwatch could be regarded as an outsourced coastguard – its core function of coordination is retained, while its assets and the risks associated with asset ownership (performance, maintenance, repair and replacement) are borne by other entities. Such an arrangement allows flexibility in a world of changing threats and rapidly developing technology. … The organisation has not invested in assets and can change the suite of equipment at its disposal by redefining its needs and renegotiating contracts with its private sector air surveillance contractors. In contrast the US Coastguard still uses World War II vessels with consequent demands on maintenance. Australia has been able to achieve this position without the cost and pain of creating then dismantling a large and cumbersome coastguard. The Committee notes that Canada and England outsource their coastal surveillance operations. As well, the US Coastguard through its Deepwater Project is seeking to replace many of its assets and use commercial assets to bring down the cost of conducting operations." (JCPAA, Review of Coastwatch, p.xi, 147-9)

If Labor were to create a single centralised Coast Guard agency, then they could be expected to abandon current arrangements for privately contracting aerial surveillance assets. If a future Coast Guard had to spend funds to purchase its own aerial surveillance assets, it would have little flexibility to upgrade the aircraft fleet, or to trial and adopt new technology.

Law Enforcement Agency Opinion

Kim Beazley recently made an audacious statement in the parliament, alleging that Coastwatch does not deliver satisfactory service for its client agencies.

"Competing priorities of different agencies are not adequately met. … These arrangements do not sufficiently serve the competing demands of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Australian Quarantine Service, the Australian Customs Service, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority or the Australian people." (Hansard, 24/9/01)

Contrary to these assertions, the Australian National Audit Office has reported that "Coastwatch client surveys show the clients have traditionally been highly satisfied with Coastwatch services." (Report 38 of 99/00) The government agencies which are among Coastwatch’s clients have reported on the public record that they are satisfied with existing arrangements. The following statements appear in submissions to the recent inquiry by the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts and Audit.

Contrary to what Mr Beazley claims, Coastwatch has long had an outstanding record of performance. When he was Finance Minister, a bi-partisan review commissioned by the government found that Coastwatch has an "enviable" record. In an otherwise scathing report which led to the re-structure of Customs, this 1993 review reported that "Coastwatch carries out client perception surveys and achieves highly on all important elements such as planning abilities, quality of services, management satisfaction of clients, timely and accurate information and positive liaison with clients. … Coastwatch has achieved what no other function in Customs has with any consistency, an enviable public image. It is regarded as a successful and worthwhile organisation performing an essential service." (p. 187)

Even Mr Beazley’s own backbench disagreed with his degrading assessment of Coastwatch. In their dissenting report on Coastwatch, the following comments were made by the Labor members of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit.

"With multi-tasking of most operational activities, a high proportion of client’s needs can be accommodated within the surveillance program. That provides clients with a level of surveillance that they could not obtain as individual agencies." (Review of Coastwatch, p. 176)

Putative Effectiveness of Labor’s Proposals

At separate press conferences ALP spokesmen claim that the new arrangements will improve the effectiveness of coastal surveillance, even though the Labor policy states that the Coast Guard would be initially funded within existing resources. Labor wants to appear to be strengthening all elements of coastal security, while deliberately holding back any costings and trivialising any concerns about the financial viability of its policy.

Yet in the study into the option of a Coastguard, which Mr Beazley wrote when last in government, he said that a separate force would make coastal policing less effective. In his study titled Australia’s Peacetime Coastal Surveillance and Protection Arrangements – A Review, Mr Beazley wrote the following.

"I have examined in some detail options for creating a dedicated force, including elements of the Defence Force additional to those already committed to surveillance and response … I am less convinced that they would lead to a system that would better counter the traffic in narcotics and sustain the kind of littoral surveillance evidently necessary for other purposes as well … to isolate this activity from the rest of Defence would lose the perceived advantages of the association."

When he is in Opposition, Mr Beazley claims there is a magic pudding. But when he was in Government, he admitted that a separate Coast Guard would both cost more and diminish the effectiveness of coastal security arrangements.

Cost of the 2000 ALP Policy

Labor estimates that its Coast Guard proposal could be funded at a cost of only $220 million, simply by pulling money from other portfolios.

Another recent proponent of a Coast Guard, Mr O’Connor of the Australian Defence Association (ADA), has estimated that a conservative "back of an envelope figure" for a Coast Guard would be $500 million. This sum is more than double the figure which Kim Beazley claims is required. By comparison the cost of the 1999 East Timor operation was $645 million. The recent parliamentary inquiry into Coastwatch noted that, on Mr O’Connor’s calculation, the Coast Guard proposal "amounts to an East Timor sized operation each year". Further, the inquiry noted, that when challenged, Mr O’Connor was "unable to point out where Coastwatch had let Australia down sufficiently to warrant the spending of another $350m a year." (JCPAA, Review of Coastwatch, pp. 141, 142)

More importantly, the parliamentary inquiry examined the funding required by the American Coast Guard (almost $8 billion for a force employing 40,000). It found that, according to the American experience, an Australian Coast Guard could only proportionately support 2,500 staff, which compares poorly against the 4,000 staff envisaged by proponents of a modest $500 million Australian Coast Guard. The deduction from this comparison was clear.

"The Committee concludes that either:

The third conclusion is the most likely. There are three reasons why Labor’s estimates are not credible. Firstly, all previous Australian government estimates were well in excess of the Labor Party’s "back of envelope" numbers. Second, all international comparisons reveal a far higher cost in practice, that Labor concedes. Third, Labor’s proposal to strip assets from Defence and other agencies will – sooner or later - require a large budgetary commitment to those other agencies to offset their loss of capability.

(i) International Comparisons

The Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts and Audit recently concluded an inquiry to ascertain, among other things, whether an Australian Coast Guard is a viable proposition. Mr Lionel Woodward, CEO of the Australian Customs Service was questionned by the committee on Coastwatch’s own view as to whether it should be upgraded to the status of a Coast Guard. He responded;

"If you look at the US experience, what has tended to happen … is a tendency for agencies, including US Customs, to complement the capability of the US Coastguard by building up their own capability. … There is a possibility of competition rather than complementarity in that, and frankly, duplication of resources … I guess I am drawing a distinction between a theoretical model, which I think you [Labor MPs] are talking about, and what happens in practice. I have been involved in public administration in Australia for 40 years. My instincts tell me that what has happened in the US would develop in Australia, not just in relation to Customs but perhaps in other agencies, including perhaps the Defence ministry."

Even putting to one side the likelihood of duplicated resources, the international cost comparison shows that the US Coast Guard model lauded by Labor is far from cheap.

In his evidence before the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Mr Allan Behm, Head of Strategy and Ministerial Services Division in the Department of Defence said that the US model was not appropriate for Australia because of the threat to the budget:

"the Coast Guard in the United States … have 12 ships similar to our FFGs, of which we have six. They have 31 medium endurance cutters, 85 patrol boats and 1,000 other boats. They have three polar icebreakers and 30 C130 aircraft, which is a few more than we have. They have 23 falcon jets, which is 23 more than we have, and 140 other aircraft. … I think that issue about costs is a fundamental issue that we have to bear in mind in Australia. Defence spends about $12 billion. We are talking about a continental coastguard arrangement [in the US] which is about half the size of our national defence spend. That is a very significant issue. … Immigration, the AFP, Customs and Defence – plus a host of others – have learnt a lot over the last 20 years or so about how you actually do cooperate and coordinate rather than having a single point of overarching control. For us the issue really is not one of control but of how we get the best use of the national asset … within the Commonwealth we are extremely good at coordination. … It is fair to say that the economy that we bring to much of this sort of activity within the Commonwealth is leading edge. It is certainly world class." [Emphasis added.]

The US Coast Guard has a staff of around 35,000 uniformed personnel, 6,000 reserves and 5,000 public servants. In comparison, Australia’s Coastwatch employs around 62 staff, 150 contractors and utilises in the course of its operations, on average, 120 ADF personnel.

There should be no doubt that Labor’s policy to emulate the Americans is much broader than an adoption of the agency name "Coast Guard." The American operational structure is Labor’s model. Mr Beazley said himself: "Stephen Martin has visited Coast Guard establishments in the United States. And, it must be said, they are something of a model for us for the things that we are proposing here today. Duncan [Kerr] has talked at length to law enforcement officials in the United States." (23/12/00) [Emphasis added]

(ii) Previous Estimates by Australian Governments

The only comprehensive Australian study on the question found in 1978 that if Australia were to create a Coast Guard, the price tag would be between $730 million to $900 million. Translated into year 2000 dollars, the cost today would be between $2.5 billion to $3.1 billion (CPI adjusted).

Should Labor accept these estimates as reliable? According to Kim Beazley’s own 1984 study on the issue, "the review judged that the order of magnitude of costs would not change substantially" from the 1977 estimates. [para 7.21] In 1984, as the then Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley had chaired and co-authored a study that concluded that setting up a Coast Guard was not a desirable policy option. This study was not just commissioned for Mr Beazley. It was run by him. In parliament he boasted that "I did this Review [sic] … along with a number of senior public servants … I am very proud to have been associated with the committee process that arrived at these conclusions." [Hansard 3/5/84] Indeed the recommendations of the Review were published in Mr Beazley’s own name, in a Chapter titled "Recommendations by the Minister" [sic]

The Beazley study noted that the estimates included capital costs of between $365 and $450 million in 1977 prices, with annual operating costs around $55 million. The Beazley study noted that these estimates did not include infrastructure and support facilities for a civilian organisation, but it noted that these costs were roughly equivalent to the capital investment required, and were additional to it. However Coastwatch has indicated that these previous estimates may understate the price impact of technological change.

"these costings [referred to in the Beazley study and the 1977 study] do not take account of the advances in, and associated costs of, information technology, communications and other gains in the design and equipping of vessels and aircraft."

(iii) Capital Requirement to Offset Transfers of Assets, Staff & Infrastructure

The Beazley study stated that if a Coast Guard were created "This review confirms the 1978 Review’s judgement that the Defence Force would require additional resources in order to avoid a degradation of its military effectiveness." [Emphasis added.] In particular, Defence would have to purchase new capability to offset the loss of Fremantle Class Patrol Boats and provide for wartime patrol and low-level battle tasks.

A range of other agencies are also current asset providers to Coastwatch, and service their own needs with the same assets that are routinely contracted to Coastwatch. If these assets are centralised under a Coast Guard, then further expenditure would be required across a range of agencies, separate from the estimates mentioned in the 1984 Beazley study. If a Coast Guard also sought to acquire experienced staff from the Navy and Customs, then the loss of personnel would create future training costs that would have to be included in any costing proposal.

Although the current Labor Coast Guard policy boasts to be an innovative plan, it counter-intuitively claims that the new coastal force would require no net fiscal commitment.

"The Australian Coast Guard will be able to take on additional responsibilities with minimal financial commitment above the (at least) $220 million that is currently spent across Commonwealth agencies on coastal surveillance and border protection." (23/1/00)

So more work, with the same money! This is a Magic Pudding policy. But wait there’s more! Labor claims that …

"A new fleet of purpose-designed vessels could be constructed to civil standards at a cost comparable to the cost of a complete refit of the Fremantles. ... Such vessels would be larger and faster than the Fremantles, and be capable of being armed as appropriate."

So Labor promises no more money, but larger vessels - regardless of what the Navy specifies is required to replace the Fremantle fleet! Defence has already announced a Request for Tender for the Fremantle replacements and the design capabilities have already been specified. In September 2001, Mr Beazley introduced into parliament a bill which sought to establish a US style Coast Guard for Australia. Mr Beazley said that if the bill passed, Labor would scrap the Request for Tender for the new Navy patrol boats.

"The tender for this replacement should be, and under a Labor government will be, given in the context of establishing the Australian Coast Guard. The significant difference between civil and military construction standards and systems will allow for a significant upgrading of our Coast Guard fleet without additional cost." (Hansard 24/9/01)

A scrapping of the tender process would set back the important replacement of the Patrol Boats by 6 to 12 months. Even more disturbing however is Kim Beazley’s lack of understanding of the current Request For Tender, which already calls for vessels to be built to commercial or civil standards. This information is readily available in the publicly released Defence Capability Plan, which details purchase proposals referred to in the Defence White Paper. Mr Beazley is ignoring the following unambiguous statement in the Capability Plan.

"The Patrol Boat Capability is planned to comprise vessels of commercial design that comply with relevant classification society rules and appropriate statutory regulations." (Defence Capability Plan, p. 257)

Labor’s promise of civil standard construction would not save a penny. The Beazley plan would leave the RAN with no small combat capable vessels, unless Defence were given supplementary funding to re-open a parallel tender of its own, duplicated by a Coast Guard tender. This would mean doubling-up of patrol boat forces, with both fleets built to civil construction standards.

Contrary to Labor’s claim, a Coast Guard is not a "single agency" policy for policing Australia’s borders. Mr Beazley argues that a Coast Guard could be funded by taking $220 million and stripping assets from a range of agencies. But Labor does not propose to abolish any of the agencies which will lose some funds and assets. Indeed, to take just one agency as a comparison, the $220 million figure is only a small portion of the Customs budget of $723 million in 2001-02. If Labor’s Coast Guard does not entirely replace Customs, Quarantine, Fisheries, Maritime Safety, Environment Australia, Immigration and other relevant law enforcement bodies, then those agencies will still be obligated to deliver their corporate mandates by financing assets that will partly overlap Coast Guard’s asset base. A Coast Guard is not a "single agency" system. Instead Labor’s policy is a formula for agency competition (all other agencies against a Coast Guard), as opposed to the current practice of agency cooperation and multi-tasking (via Coastwatch)

Labor introduced legislation into the parliament on 24 September 2001 which makes plain that there will be duplication and competition. Labor’s Australian Coast Guard Bill 2001 does not annex law enforcement powers from any single federal agency. Instead, under section 5 of Labor’s proposed law, Coast Guard officers would borrow powers which are concurrently exercised by police, customs officers, fisheries officers and immigration officials.

The public is wise to Labor’s rubbery numbers and muddled thinking. In an editorial, the Sydney Morning Herald pointed to Mr Beazley’s failure to release his costings to support the promised extra capabilities.

"When he was Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence in 1984, Mr Beazley rejected a maritime police force on two grounds: first, because of its estimated cost of $1 billion; and second, because he was not convinced it would ‘lead to a system that would better counter the traffic in narcotics’. Senator Vanstone estimates that the cost of the proposed new maritime police force would now be about $2 billion. Mr Beazley disputes this and claims that the cost would not be much more than the $220 million already devoted to the various maritime surveillance and protection programs. Mr Beazley will have to explain more convincingly why a proposal that was rejected in 1984 is now necessary. Does the [prior] announcement by the Prime Minister of a $124 million boost for Coastwatch trump Labor’s policy? The devil clearly lies in the financial details … Labor ... should release its detailed costings now, rather than some time near the next election, so there can be an informed debate." (25/1/00)

But Labor, unlike the government, has proposed no extra funding for coastal surveillance. Nor will it release costings to show how its plans are affordable. Yet Labor would have voters believe that its Coast Guard could deliver more services for the same dollars. At the Press Conference where the policy was launched, the contradictions were evident to all. Mr Beazley could not help himself.

"There will be required additional funds, not greatly additional. But we have said, if you take a look at our papers here, that we will be elaborating on those costs closer to the election campaign. … Well, initially you’d replace the Fremantle class patrol boasts … But you’ve also got to remember, they’ve also got those new Customs boats … Over time you would want to move away from leasing that capability to, as the Americans do, putting it in-house. That’s a big expenditure item, that one." [Emphasis added] (Transcript 23/1/00)

The recent parliamentary inquiry estimated the minimum impact of this asset loss on Customs.

"Customs would still need a maritime arm. Customs told the Committee that 30% of the operational time of its 8 Bay Class Vessels would not be spent on Coastwatch operations. Putting the Bay Class Vessels into a coastguard would mean that Customs would need at least 2 new vessels. As well, there would be competition for personnel." (Bob Charles JCPAA Chairman, Hansard, 22 August 2001).

This is an understatement of the requirements of a stand-alone Coast Guard. If Labor were to faithfully follow the US model, which it says it will replicate, then the new organisation would require significant support infrastructure to replace that currently provided by various naval bases, Defence maintenance facilities, Defence intelligence support, plus planning and operational guidance provided by military headquarters. The Kim Beazley of today is in disagreement with the Kim Beazley of 1984, who wrote the following conclusion;

"a totally new civilian force, unable to draw on the established training organisations, communications and support infrastructure and other resources of the Defence Force would inevitably have the burden of even greater capital costs. Moreover, the creation of a new Commonwealth agency with law enforcement powers spanning a wide range of matters would not be without its difficulties, not least in its interface with the States."

The recent parliamentary inquiry into Coastwatch endorsed the conclusions made by Kim Beazley in 1984, writing that it considered "the capital costs of purchasing or refitting the 50 vessels [is] envisaged to be substantial, as would be the annual costs for maintenance, replacement, staffing and organisational infrastructure. In effect a second navy would be created." (p. 142) Such a second navy could only ever be a pretend navy.

The prohibitive costs of the Labor proposal have even been castigated by the Community and Public Sector Union, a political ally of the Labor Party which is seldom known for supporting efficient bureaucratic arrangements. In its submission to the current parliamentary inquiry the CPSU was dismissive of the Coast Guard concept.

"The CPSU considers that the creation of a single border agency is not necessary, and would be likely to incur higher operating costs and excessive co-ordination work between related government agencies. … The CPSU supports the retention of a properly resourced and skilled Coastwatch service with high levels of accountability to its client agencies."

Damage to the Australian Defence Force

Labor has two options for finding the money to fund a US-style Coast Guard. Either it can increase total defence funding, or it can cut back key Defence acquisitions and programs to pay for the new priority. Mr Beazley has made clear how he will pay for the Coast Guard. As recently as June this year he was asked specifically whether Defence would face cuts and he replied as follows

"we also maintain our right to reprioritise in terms of the Defence needs and interests of the nation. For example, we think they should spend more money on a coastguard." (13/6/01)

Even from the very day that he released the Coast Guard policy, Mr Beazley’s financing approach was to take the money away from the Australian Defence Force.

"there’s weight and space in the Defence budget for that replacement." (23/1/00)

On this issue, Labor’s spokesmen sing with one voice. Shadow Treasurer, Simon Crean, admitted to Jon Faine on Melbourne ABC radio that a Beazley government will in fact slash White Paper commitments to fund a Coast Guard.

"Clearly the $27 billion dollars gives us the scope to implement one" (23/5/01).

Labor MPs were surprisingly honest in their dissenting report written for the recent inquiry by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. They made quite clear that the transfer of Defence Assets such as patrol boats would spell Defence redundancies and corresponding cuts to Defence housing.

"Civil maritime surveillance and response is by definition a non-military function. This can produce significant savings in terms of military personnel costs including military superannuation, subsidised housing and service allowances." (JCPAA, Review of Coastwatch, p. 189)

The Labor policy proposes that the Coast Guard would have an operational commander on secondment from the Australian Defence Force. Far from being an innovation, this idea borrows from the existing arrangement which sees senior Coastwatch staff seconded from the ADF. The Prime Minister’s Task Force recommended the creation of the current two star officer position of Director-General Coastwatch, which is currently occupied by Rear Admiral Mark Bonser, RAN. Since July 1999 Defence has also provided two other military specialists to Coastwatch. This aspect of the Labor policy is another idea lifted from the Prime Ministerial Task Force’s recommendations of six months earlier. It is another empty Labor promise.

Despite the Labor objective of centralising all coastal surveillance resources under one umbrella organisation, it is not possible to rellocate assets such as AEW&C aircraft, PC3 Orions or RAN patrol boats away from Defence command without a significant loss of Defence capability. Labor has promised to take Patrol Boats away from the navy and from Customs. The Labor Policy states that "The financial, personnel and physical resources to establish the Australian Coast Guard already exist across various Commonwealth agencies." To duplicate these assets within an autonomous Coast Guard would create a significant financial impost on Australia’s taxpayers.

Whenever ADF assets provide assistance to Coastwatch they remain under Defence command, even though Coastwatch is the service coordinator. By contrast, the US Coast Guard has full control over each mission, because it has a large purpose-designed asset base that is financially supported by a large population of taxpayers and a wealthy national economy. Australia’s economy and its geographic size (covering one tenth of the globe’s surface) require that there be asset sharing between Defence and Coastwatch.

Labor’s policy is to design specialist vessels to replace the Fremantles, or in other words, Defence needs will not be the paramount consideration in the patrol boat design. As recently as June, the Shadow Spokesperson for Fisheries Gavan O’Connor said that under Labor a Coast Guard "will be provided with specialised vessels" (Hansard, 7 June 2001) This confirms very specific plans spelt out by Shadow Customs spokesman, Duncan Kerr. In November 1999, he told the Herald Sun newspaper that 12 high speed twin hull vessels of 45 to 60 meters would operate in Northern waters and three 80 metre ships would operate in the Southern Ocean (21/11/99).

The Labor Policy is highly schizophrenic about the circumstances in which Coast Guard resources would fall under control of the ADF. It states that the "Coast Guard will complement the Royal Australian Navy in time of conflict", [emphasis added] but then goes on to say that the Coast Guard will be "placed under ADF command" in times of conflict. In his media release, announcing the policy, Mr Beazley writes that "In peacetime, the Australian Coast Guard will be a maritime police force within the Justice and Customs portfolio. … In times of declared emergency or times of war, the Australian Coast Guard will form a fourth arm of the ADF." This administrative arrangement for a yo-yo point of command raises more problems than the policy has explained. In this aspect, the policy is unique in the world. Under United States law the Coast Guard serves as a permanent fourth branch of the US armed forces:

"The Coast Guard … shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times" 14 U.S.C §1 (1982).

Labor has not explained how an agency can readily swop either the military chain of command, the line of Ministerial responsibility or the line of Departmental accountability.

By describing the Coast Guard as the "fourth arm of the Australian Defence Force", the policy simplistically assumes that Coastwatch resources are relevant to Defence requirements. This was not the same view expressed by Kim Beazley in his 1984 report, in his capacity as a Minister.

"there is no substantial correlation between peacetime civil and contingent defence surveillance requirements. In terms of areas, only northern and north western Australia have common high priority in both peacetime civil and contingent defence requirements. Even there, defence surveillance in a military contingency would be oriented heavily towards detection of movements of submarines, military aircraft and naval surface vessels as well as the fishing vessels, ocean-going yachts, pleasure craft and light aircraft that dominate the peacetime civil requirement. This concern with different targets and the basically different nature of the threat being confronted also leads to the divergence between the types of surveillance operations needed in peacetime as against those needed in a situation of military threat." [Paragraph 5.50]

If Coast Guard assets were to be made inter-operable, between civilian and military tasks, then this opens up legal complications. If the Bay Class vessels were fitted to carry mounted guns, they would become lawful targets liable to attack in time of armed conflict. The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994) is regarded as the best statement of law on the legal status of armed civilian vessels in time of armed conflict. Paragraph 60(f) says that such vessels may be attacked as military objectives if they are "armed to an extent that they could inflict damage to a warship. This includes light individual weapons for the defence of personnel".

Labor is confused about the design specifications for the Fremantle replacements and Custom’s civilian vessels. The current government’s policy is that the defence of Australia requires an ADF that is prepared for the concerted use of high levels of force, to destroy an enemy. By contrast, Coastwatch requires the exercise of policing powers – to enforce civil and international law – with the minimal use of force. The Labor policy for an interoperable Coast Guard would inevitably compromise this long standing distinction.

More serious for the Australian Defence Force, a separate Coast Guard would have a serious affect on the regular Naval training and experience of junior officers and sailors. The transfer of patrol boats away from Defence would remove opportunities which are currently an integral component of naval training. Mr Behm Head of Strategy and Ministerial Services Division in the Department of Defence observed the following.

"Patrol boats [are] a critical asset for the Royal Australian Navy, all the way from induction of junior staff through to the most senior command of Navy … for many of our most experienced naval officers the initial operational experience that they get through the patrol boats is integral to the expertise that the Navy brings to much higher levels of operational expertise. For these sorts of reasons, as we said in our submission, Defence does have a number of reservations about just how smart it would be to go down the path of the establishment of a freestanding coastguard."

The duplication of resources has a second dimension, as pointed out by Commander Frank Evans, of the Navy League of Australia.

"If we were going to have a separate, more localised navy, we would be looking for the same people to man ships. Young men are not so keen on going to sea these days … Navy has the resources and the ships, the patrol boats. Defence has the Orions. We must use them. We do not want to duplicate it and try to find people to man a duplicated defence force."

The mainstay of Coastwatch’s regular contracted vessel patrol days are provided by the Navy. Coastwatch has access to the 1,200 seas days of patrols by the Bay Class Fleet of Customs vessels, compared to its arrangement for 1,800 RAN patrol boat sea days. The RAN therefore provides 60% of the regular contracted effort, although additional vessels from various providers are coordinated by Coastwatch against ad-hoc client needs. The Navy’s assistance is very close to or exceeds the 1,800 day target. For example actual achievement in financial year 98/99 was 1,868 patrol boat days.

Labor’s plan is to remove the Navy from Coastwatch and replace it with a pretend Navy, that will be supported by an army of bureaucrats. The US model which Labor proposes to adopt involves some 5,000 bureaucrats.

The Navy League of Australia recognises in its submission to the current parliamentary inquiry that there is a clear threat to the RAN contained in the Labor Coastguard policy.

"The League’s principal concern is that pressure to form a separate Coast Guard divorced from Defence except for essential resources, apart from the cost of equipping a separate organisation, will inevitably cause competition between Defence and Coast Guard for funds and personnel, both in short supply and most likely weakening the Navy in particular." (para 8.2)

Labor has suggested that if there were ever any future explosion in unauthorised air movements (UAMs), or "black flights", then a Coast Guard could provide a magical answer. Currently UAMs are not a major problem. Labor’s policy on UAMs ignores the fact that the only existing systems for comprehensively tracking and intercepting UAMs involve military hardware. In the United States, 20,000 air movements are tracked at any one time and any deviation from flight plan can trigger the deployment of response assets. In their own dissenting report written for the recent inquiry by Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Labor MPs conceded that this was a problem best suited to military assets.

"[T]he US Government had demonstrated that strategies are available to deal with the UAM threat, however these … used expensive sophisticated military type assets and many of them." [sic] (Review of Coastwatch, p.200)

Lessons from the US and Other Overseas Operations

As reported by the Australian National Audit Office in its report on Coastwatch (Report 38, 99/00), there are several areas where Australia’s Coastwatch can learn from the US Coast Guard. Areas for cooperation and exchange of information include new technology, surveillance methods, client response and reporting systems, and methods for interception of drugs and suspected illegal immigrants.

Labor’s policy misses the following points which are noted by the National Audit Office in its report on Coastwatch.

"4.56 In this regard, the ANAO recognises the efforts of Coastwatch and the RAN in establishing a working relationship with the US Coastguard. This has included the secondment of a US Coastguard officer to the RAN to provide advice and to implement better practice in tasking techniques. Ties with the US Coastguard were also strengthened in late 1999 when the Director-General Coastwatch visited the United States of America. The visit included a series of meetings with the US Coastguard on the sharing of information/ intelligence, particularly in relation to people smuggling."

Coastwatch already regularly studies and incorporates whatever US advice and experience is relevant to Australian operations and circumstances. The seconded Coastguard officer, study visits and regular correspondence have all predated Labor’s new-found interest in the American "model". It is not necessary to mimic the United States operations in every aspect. Australia’s operations are at the leading edge, for what is viable within the constraints of our financial resources and current technology.

There are a number of countries that have effective border policing arrangements. Not all of these adopt the one agency model of the United States. In the United Kingdom, responsibility for the delivery of coastal surveillance and protection is shared among several agencies:

There are also a plethora of local shires and emergency services which also cover the range of services provided by Australia’s Coastwatch. The UK "Coastguard" is tasked with the role of search and rescue, leaving it to other more relevant agencies to police their respective briefs. Most of the assets used by the above agencies are provided by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.

Canada also separates coastal protection functions among a range of agencies. The Canadian "Coastguard" has a narrow mandate, similar to the British equivalent, confining it to search, rescue and environmental monitoring. The relevant Canadian agencies are:

The majority of the above Canadian agencies provide their own assets to carry out their duties. Arrangements such as this show that the American model is not universally followed, not even in a near neighbour country. This view is expressed forcefully by Commander Frank Evans, of the Navy League of Australia.

"It needs to be said that no country in the world attempts to emulate the United States Coast Guard. Many people say they have coastguards, but they do not really. … It needs to be said too that the United States Coast Guard at the present time also has its problems with ageing craft, and has enlistment problems and financial problems." (Testimony, JCPAA 17/10/00)

Even the Coast Guard itself recognises its capital shortfalls, and describes itself as comparing poorly against the equivalent coastal protection fleets in 41 other countries.

"… the Coast Guard deepwater fleet is ageing and in urgent need of replacement. The U.S. Coast Guard’s physical assets (cutters, aircraft, and shore facilities) have been undercapitalized for years. Only two of the 41 countries throughout the world with similar sized navies or coast guards have an older physical plant."

(www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/Factcards/NationalSecurity.html)

Likewise, recent congressional testimony by the Inspector General of the US Transportation Department has confirmed that there are serious deficiencies in the performance and capability of the US Coast Guard. Last year, 84% of Coast Guard’s small search and rescue boats were found "not ready for sea" and 90% of search and rescue stations were undermanned and overworked. Inspector General Kenneth Mead said that existing problems cannot be cured without an increase in the procurement budget of more than double (from US$400 million to over US$1 billion), and maintaining the higher level of expenditure for two decades. The Charleston Post and Courier concludes that;

"After years of neglect, the Coast Guard stands on the brink of crippling shortcomings in equipment and personnel. As a result, it is falling short in all its missions." (2/7/01)

The Australian Government’s view is that it is preferable to follow a model using a range of specialist agencies to enforce the wide variety of laws that apply beyond our coast: spanning drug interdiction; illegal immigrant interdiction; fisheries law; quarantine and customs law; search and rescue; vessel safety; and environmental laws. The current Australian model is one that achieves the best balance, between delivering a specialist system of law enforcement, while also ensuring that resources are coordinated and information is shared in a way that benefits all relevant law enforcement agencies.

Despite its attempt to ape US administrative arrangements, Labor’s policy does not canvass regular information-sharing with the US Coast Guard about operational tactics and equipment. Defence and Coastwatch are engaged in joint investigation of new technologies to improve coastal surveillance operations. Emerging technologies include unmanned aerial vehicles, hyper-spectral imaging, surface wave radar and unattended surface and sub-surface sensors. The Government has recently announced its intention to allocate around $300 million for the purchase of a number of Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Tactical UAVs. Acquisition of Airbourne Early Warning & Control aircraft will also assist in future surveillance operations. The Labor policy does not contemplate a forward-thinking agenda which includes such technologies or research and development.

Legislative Implications

The Australian Federal Police also criticises the Labor approach in its submission to the current parliamentary inquiry.

"The AFP considers that if an Australian Coastguard were to be established, it would require a specific legislative charter which included a clear statement of the Coastguard’s functions and powers. However, the AFP continues to question the need for the establishment of another law enforcement agency."

While the Labor policy is ambiguous about the interaction between a Coastguard and Defence, it is silent on the question of its interaction with the Australian Federal Police. However the document clearly states that a Labor Coastguard would usurp "The enforcement of all Commonwealth maritime law, including:

This list includes areas in which the AFP is currently responsible for conducting criminal investigations and prosecuting cases: notably drug trafficking and people smuggling.

The Labor policy also proposes that a Coast Guard should assume "responsibility for oil spill and environmental protection and pollution control, and will respond to the increasing need for surveillance in our southern waters to prevent … environmental degradation." As new responsibilities or higher expectations are placed upon the central agency, such as environmental law enforcement, Coast Guard officers would have a decreased ability to perform existing tasks well. The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) has noted the dangers that a "single force" approach would present for fisheries law enforcement.

"[W]here the exercise of Fisheries Officer powers requires adequate training and expertise, and the consequences of error may be large, AFMA would wish to maintain full control over fisheries specific investigations and field activities by those specialist Fisheries Officers. In particular, AFMA wishes to avoid failure of prosecutions through an inadequate understanding of fisheries law and procedures."

The Labor policy is one that assumes that a Coast Guard can either find or train men and women who can combine, the knowledge of an environmental scientist, the legal training and experience of an Immigration officer, a Fisheries officer, an Australian Federal Police Officer, a Customs officer, and the skills of a Naval officer. The likelihood is that if Labor were elected, it would find that it has to appoint specialist law enforcement officers for each respective field of law enforcement, segregate the legal training and effectively create mini-bureaucracies within a Coast Guard. It might as well leave the existing specialist agencies to carry on doing their good work.

Contrary to Labor rhetoric, a Coast Guard would not become the "single agency" that polices Australia’s borders. In September 2001, Labor introduced a poorly drafted and skeletal bill into the parliament, which was designed to create bureaucratic duplication. Labor’s Australian Coast Guard Bill 2001 is riddled with drafting flaws and legal problems.

During the Tampa people smuggling incident of September 2001, the Labor Party proved that it is not genuine about providing law officers with the powers they need to deal with illegal incursions into Australian waters. Kim Beazley voted against the Border Protection Bill 2001 in the House of Representatives on 29 August 2001. Labor does not fully appreciate that a Coast Guard without the appropriate legal powers would be little more than a spectator fleet.

In his speech opposing the Border Protection Bill, Kim Beazley argued that there is no pressing immigration problem that warrants new legal solutions.

"We do not face in these circumstances a national catastrophe … the serious problem … already has sufficient law to cover the position associated with it. We do not need to go down this particular road. … In a piece of legislation to deal with a specific problem, you do not actually need to go through a process of totally overturning what you have stood for as a country over the years – and that is what this legislation does." (Hansard 29 August 2001)

These are the most audacious words from someone who has proposed a new bureaucracy for precisely the reason that there are apparently new threats and abnormal problems.

"We have seen a surge in illicit drug imports into Australia and a resumption of the threat of substantial illegal immigration that had largely petered out during the 1980s. Quarantine and health problems are rampant in the regions around us." [Emphasis added.] (The Australian 29/12/00)

When boxed into one corner, Mr Beazley claims that Australia’s borders are so besieged that we need a new bureaucracy. Then when Australia faces a specific new threat in the form of massive people smuggling rackets, Mr Beazley goes weak and claims that our law enforcement officers need no legislative support to solve the problem. Labor claimed to be greatly concerned by the Tampa incident. Subsequently when Labor introduced its Australian Coast Guard Bill 2001, it proposed absolutely no new, expanded or revised powers of apprehension in any field of maritime law enforcement. The Coast Guard proposal was exposed in this bill as a purely symbolic proposition without substance.

Labor’s Shallow Reasons for its Policy

The following arguments for creating a Coast Guard were advanced by Labor in its modest-sized policy document.

Symbolism The Labor policy states:

"An Australian Coast Guard is a symbol of national security."

By rebadging the existing Coastwatch operation under a more "glamorous" name, Mr Beazley can claim to be "creating" a new body that will tackle the challenges of illegal immigration and drugs.

What Labor has ignored is that the Australian Defence Force is the foremost symbol and guarantor of national security. Unfortunately Labor’s Coast Guard policy is one that will damage several areas of defence capability and training, particularly by taking Fremantle Class Patrol Boats away from Defence control.

One of the main public relations problems currently faced by Coastwatch, is that as a co-ordinator of services for client agencies, its work is not often recognised by the public at large. The Defence Department submitted the following view to the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts and Audit.

"In the public perception there is difficulty, for example, in associating images on television of the Navy detaining suspected illegal immigrants and fishermen with the overall responsibilities of Coastwatch for conducting the civil surveillance program."

Dr Stephen Martin, Labor’s current Defence spokesman admitted as such when he was last in government and he was chair of a House of Representatives committee which reviewed Coastwatch.

"There appeared to be confusion in some submissions about Coastwatch’s role, with some apparently considering that Coastwatch was or should be concerned with both surveillance and protection. These submissions proposed either integration into a defence controlled structure or to a body along the lines of a ‘coastguard’. … Satisfaction among major client agencies is at a high level, but submissions from some agencies and individuals indicate that there is a degree of ignorance about the changes which have taken place in Coastwatch’s administration." (HRSCFPA, First Report on an Inquiry into Aspects of the Australian Customs Service, p. 32, 43.)

In 1990, Dr Martin noted the "confusion" and "ignorance" about Coastwatch’s successful operations. Today, he seeks to exploit what he once described as "ignorance", by promoting a policy that offers a fake allure of new action. Coastwatch, in its evidence to the recent parliamentary committee inquiry into Coastwatch made clear that it does not seek publicity from its operational successes.

"It is a feature of the Coastwatch modus operandi that the successful completion of an operation (e.g. drug seizure or apprehension of SIEV/FFV) is, in reality, an outcome for the client rather than for Coastwatch. The essential Key Performance Measure for Coastwatch is the completion of the surveillance and/or response task to the satisfaction of the client."

Labor MPs noted this lack of publicity for Coastwatch, in their dissenting report, in the most blunt Machiavellian terms.

"There is no quantitative data available that might give an indication of the public’s understanding of Coastwatch’s role and the performance of its operations … It may well be the case, in terms of both military and non-military threats, that given the potential capability of current and emerging technologies, the community actually underestimates the practicality of Australia maintaining a high level of surveillance and response to threats in its maritime approaches." (JCPAA, Review of Coastwatch p. 175)

The Labor policy is one that aims to create a bold organisational "symbol" by re-shuffling assets and agency funding. But in achieving this end Labor could do much damage by stripping a number of agencies of their core assets, including the Australian Defence Force, and assigning responsibility to a new bureaucracy that has little operational experience.

Budget-Slashing Efficiencies The Labor policy states:

"The financial, personnel and physical resources to establish the Australian Coast Guard already exist across various Commonwealth agencies … the Australian Coast Guard will be able to deliver coastal surveillance and maritime protection services … more efficiently … It will be able to consolidate and better utilise existing resources, and achieve considerable economies of scale through streamlined administrative arrangements, resource-sharing, and operational coordination." [Emphasis added]

Mr Beazley claimed in parliament that a Coast Guard would save on costs, as compared with the existing arrangements. He promised significant efficiencies, using cliched language like "integrating and rationalising", "economies of scale", "streamlined administrative arrangements", "resource sharing", and boasting that the Coast Guard idea is "a much more economically responsible initiative than anything that the Howard government has come up with." (Hansard, 24/9/01)

This argument is not credible because the policy document states that there will be extra responsibilities, added command structures, more functions required and a replication of the US Coast Guard model.

Commitment to Darwin Voters The Coastguard policy was launched at Stokes Hill Wharf in Darwin with Territory ALP Leader Clare Martin in attendance, along with both Federal Labor MPs for the Northern Territory, Warren Snowdon and Senator Trish Crossin. Kim Beazey pledged to headquarter a Coast Guard in Darwin, if Labor were to win the next election. (NT News 24/1/00) The policy suggests co-location with Defence Headquarters Northern Command (HQ Norcom). This promise ignores the significant coordination that is already occurring out of Darwin. Normally when RAN patrol boats are assigned to the Civil Surveillance Program, the operational authority is the Commander Headquarters Northern Command. The Coastwatch Darwin personnel work in an integrated manner with HQ Norcom processes, attending daily briefs and having access to ADF command and control systems.

Mr Beazley is offering no new commitment to Darwin. But instead he plans to downgrade the RAN’s role in vital surveillance tasks.

The Coalition is the only side of politics in Australia to have made a concrete promise of new funding for coastal surveillance forces based in Darwin. In line with the Government’s commitment to enhance surveillance in our northern waters, four Patrol Boats were recently transferred to Darwin - two from Perth and two from Sydney – bringing to ten the number based in Darwin. A further 130 personnel will be transferred to permanent Darwin-based jobs, increasing the Base’s workforce to 405 personnel.

The Coalition’s recent upgrade of Darwin Naval Base included construction of a 146m wharf, extensions to the existing wharf and additional fuel and storage facilities. On 1 September 2001 the Government also announced a Request for Tender to replace the Fremantle Class Patrol Boats. The new vessels will be slightly larger than the 42 metre Fremantles and will require an additional 200 metre extension to the Darwin Wharf in time for the asset replacement in late 2004. The Coalition’s commitment to Darwin is concrete, demonstrated and ongoing. By contrast, Labor’s promise of a "new headquarters" is – on closer inspection – a plan to continue liaison with HQ Norcom and a cover for the planned loss of RAN jobs in Darwin when Labor takes the patrol boats away from Defence.

The architect of Labor’s Coast Guard policy, Duncan Kerr, is more concerned to increase policing of the Southern Oceans around his home state of Tasmania, than he is to protect northern waters. His plan has always been to place at least three of the fifteen patrol boats in southern waters and distribute the remainder between the north and east coast (Sunday Herald Sun, 21/11/99). By contrast, the Coalition recognises that Australia’s north and north-west are the present hotspots, where resources are most needed to combat people smuggling, illicit drug trafficking and illegal fishing. The patrol Boat force is currently home ported in Darwin (10 patrol boats) and Cairns (5 patrol boats). The security of Australia’s coasts should not be compromised to satisfy one Tasmanian ALP politician.

Added to the Beazley promise of a headquarters for Darwin, and the southern fleet promise from Kerr, an unattributed Labor source has promised a "major port" for Lakes Entrance in Victoria (News Transcript 6:30pm, Radio 3GG 25/7/01). Voters should feel suspicious when a variety of Labor MPs claim that the Coast Guard will relocate resources into their respective electorates. The construction or refit costs for a maritime base usually begins in the millions of dollars, yet Labor claims that the change to a Coast Guard would have no net cost. Their vague funding formula suggests that any new promised port facilities would likely be funded by cutting existing Defence facilities and staff in Darwin and Cairns.

 

Conclusions

Six months prior to Labor’s Coast Guard announcement, the government announced a $124 million package of upgrades to Coastwatch. In the Defence White Paper, there were even greater spending initiatives which will strengthen Australia’s coastal protection arrangements. The commitments in the White Paper, for our Maritime procurement program of $1.8 billion over the next decade, are carefully costed and fully funded.

The Labor policy has no such rigour and has no honest set of costings attached. When he was last in government, Kim Beazley confirmed that a US-style Coast Guard would cost between $2.5 to $3.1 billion (in today’s dollars). He rejected the proposal then, because he recognised that a Coast Guard would strip away ADF assets and that "the Defence Force would require additional resources in order to avoid a degradation of its military effectiveness."

Mr Beazley’s proposals have been rejected by Mr Beazley himself. If implemented, his policy will reduce the effectiveness of the existing service, disadvantage the Australian Defence Force and require unjustified further expenditure.

 

 

 

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