MINISTER FOR DEFENCE

THE HON DR BRENDAN NELSON MP

 

 

19 March 2007

 

 

“AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE AIR POWER”

 

 

SPEECH TO THE

CHIEF OF AIR FORCE’S

AIR SHOW CONFERENCE

 

(Check against delivery)

INTRODUCTION

 

Air Marshall Shepherd and the men and women of the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Highness, visiting Chiefs and senior officers, industry representatives, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

 

 

AIR POWER IN PERSPECTIVE

(THE F-111 EXPERIENCE)

 

For a middle size power like Australia, the major decisions involved in investing in Air Combat Capability come around once in a generation. 

 

In a democratic country it is not only natural, but important that these decisions attract scrutiny, debate and even controversy. 

 

But if you think the decisions about our future Air Combat Capability have been and will continue to be difficult for me to make and defend, spare a thought for my predecessors! 

 

The controversy surrounding our investment in the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter and the more recent decision to acquire 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet multi-role aircraft, pales in comparison to the utter ridicule that was heaped upon Australia’s decision to proceed with the F-111s in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. 

 

In February 1970, the Melbourne Herald Newspaper crystallised elite opinion when it reported the calls of experts for the cancellation of the F-111 project, along with the description of the plane as a “dodo”. 

 

In March 1970, the same paper concluded that: “this seems the moment to press in Washington for cancellation of our F-111 contract and for the substitution of a plan that really works”.

 

In the same month, Sydney’s Daily Mirror editorial concluded: “…the F-111 bomber is finally exposed as a flop”.

 

Well, unlike the Herald and Daily Mirror which have long ceased to exist, our fleet of F-111s are still going strong, having served, along with our fleet of FA-18s, as one of the dual pillars of our Air Combat Capability for thirty four years and counting.

 

When the F-111s were finally delivered in 1973, they provided Australia with: a penetrating, long range strike capability capable of defeating all air defences; a formidable maritime strike platform; and (with the reconnaissance version) a capability for penetrating reconnaissance and attack assessment. 

 

The F-111s remained the best aircraft in the region for decades, aided by their mid-life avionics upgrade in the 1990s which made the avionics fully digital and compatible with modern weapons such as AGM-142 stand-off, terminally guided air to surface weapon.

 

The F-111s capability – to strike at long range, in all weather, in day or night – provided Australia with extremely effective air defences and with a strong deterrent to any “adventurism” against Australia and our interests.

 

Just last month, our F-111s took part in Exercise Red Flag – the world’s most advanced air combat exercise – where we trained with (and against) the best American and British aircraft in mock combat missions over the western deserts of the United States.  For the first time in an exercise of this type, our F-111s were supported by our recently delivered C-17 transport aircraft, which now gives us the global reach to sustain our forces.

 

At the time of the 2000 Defence Paper it was assessed that the F-111 could be kept in service until 2020.  But subsequent detailed analysis by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation has determined that 2020 is unachievable without substantial new investment and that even with this investment, the F-111 and our air superiority would be subject to increased risks. 

 

The decision was therefore taken to bring the retirement date forward and we have just announced that this date will be sometime in 2010. 

 

It is imperative that we decide when to retire the F-111 fleet, rather than finding ourselves in a position where this decision is made for us.

 

That some pundits are so enamoured with the F-111 that they would have its life extended almost indefinitely speaks volumes for their service, while standing in stark contrast to what the pundits were saying nearly four decades ago. 

 

Criticism then, as now, was mostly well intentioned, often constructive and sometimes quite justifiable (the F-111s were beset with significant teething problems).  But I bring up the past today, in order to make an important point about our future. 

 

In making these once in a generation decisions about Australia’s air combat capability, it is extremely important that we fix our sights well into the distance. 

 

With these decisions featuring prominently on the Government’s radar in recent years and leading up to the critical decision to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter, due in 2008, much of my focus as Defence Minister has been and will continue to be, on Australia’s Air Combat Capability needs – for the next generation.

 

 

THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF AIR POWER

 

Across the world, the rapid rise of air power as a pre-eminent military capability can be attributed to three basic, but complementary capabilities:

 

·        Information superiority, achieved by synthesising intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations that are persistent and high-fidelity.

 

·        The ability of air power to influence the battlespace in both conventional and unconventional ways.

 

·        The ability of air power to respond in a timely and proportionate manner to create precise effects with limited collateral damage.

 

In Australia’s case, our future Air Combat Capability requirements are also influenced significantly by our geographic, demographic and strategic landscape. 

 

 

AUSTRALIA’S SECURITY LANDSCAPE

 

Australia is a vast nation-continent with littoral and off shore interests.  Our near neighbourhood is archipelagic, oceanic and strategically dynamic. 

 

A particular challenge for Australia is that posed by the arc of instability in our immediate north, from East Timor through to the south-west Pacific Island states.

 

We are resolved to use our Defence capability to help bring stability to this region, to not only prevent the prospect of humanitarian disaster, but for the simple reason that we cannot afford to have states become havens for trans-national criminals or terrorists on our doorstep.

 

Our broader region is dynamic and growing in strategic significance.  Asia includes 20 countries with three and a half billion people that account for almost half of the world’s trade and about 40% of global arms deliveries.  It has eight of the world’s ten largest armies.

 

Australia by contrast, has a population that is relatively small but which is also comparatively wealthy.  According to the CIA, Australia has the 52^nd largest population in the world, but has the 17^th largest economy. 

 

In assessing our strategic environment, there are some potential threats we can more readily anticipate.  However we face a future that will be shaped largely not by the things we know, but the things we do not.

 

In the post-September 11 world, we must be prepared for unpredictability and uncertainty, with new threats capable of emerging with little warning due to, for example:

 

·        The growth of non-State actors as strategic players, both globally and in our region.

 

·        A technological revolution in which many nations in our region will acquire the most advanced military hardware and where non-State actors can more easily gain harmful technologies.

 

·        Increased movement across borders, making it difficult to control the movement of people and capabilities that may pose a threat in our region.

 

In a post September 11 world, the Australian Government also takes the view that what happens beyond our immediate region has everything to do with us. 

 

Specifically, our generation faces a very real challenge from a resurgent totalitarianism, in the form of Islamic extremism.

 

While this threat is harder to see than the threat of earlier conflicts, it represents no less a danger to our people, interests and values than the threat posed by communism and fascism in the last century. 

 

When taking a long term view of our security and defence capability, we also think about our alliances and in particular our alliance with the United States, which has been an important pillar of our defence and security architecture for well over half a century.

 

 

IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA’S AIR FORCE

 

This geographic, demographic and strategic landscape has significant implications for Australia and our approach to air combat capability. 

 

Our expansive geography and the sheer size of our Exclusive Economic Zones makes monitoring and protecting our sovereign territory a significant challenge.  It makes control of the airspace above our territory and maritime approaches, especially crucial. 

 

Our expansive geography also makes all deployments, even domestic deployments, expeditionary in nature.  So, whether we are talking about defending Australia or undertaking operations abroad with allies and coalition partners, our Defence Force requires an expeditionary capability.  

 

Our relatively small, but comparatively wealthy population means that what we lack in size must be made up for with technological sophistication. 

 

With limited manpower and long lead times, rapid mobilisation in the face of a threat is difficult, which means Australia must be fully prepared, with a “ready to go”, technically advanced air combat capability.  

 

The combination of vast geography, with a relatively small population places a high premium on balance, agility and flexibility. 

 

Australia needs an Air Force with a “high-end” capability that ensures we can win a fight.  Australia also needs a strike capability that will, in the words of our 2000 Defence White Paper, “allow Australia more scope to determine the pace and location of hostilities…impose major defensive costs on an adversary contemplating hostile action against us…provide excellent support to Australian forces deployed abroad and…offer a valuable option for contributing to regional coalitions.”

 

We also need an Air Force which can operate in a full range of lower threat, lower technology environments.  And we need a full range of capabilities with the ability to dynamically swing between them. 

 

Australia’s Air Force must complement and operate in synergy with our other Defence capabilities.  And for our Air Force to be fully effective and relevant, it must be interoperable with our allies and partners.

 

 

A FULLY NETWORKED AIR FORCE

 

Over the next decade, one of the biggest changes for Australia’s Air Force, as with the rest of Defence, will be in the evolution from a marginally networked Force to one that is fully networked.  The current Defence Capability Plan will deliver the network and advanced operational capabilities, systemically designed to exploit that network. This will enable the Air Force to be more effective and efficient across the full range of warlike and non-warlike operations.

 

With the realised Defence Capability Plan, the RAAF will become part of a seamless, fully networked military and national security capability. From around 2016, we envisage a seamless national command and control, with national and military operations vertically orchestrated.

 

This will involve four developments, through the Defence Capability Plan, that will change the nature of today’s Air Force.

 

1.      A smart, high-capacity network will provide wide-bandwidth, high-resolution data and communications connectivity across the force.  This will change the way information is moved, shared and utilised, providing greater breadth, quality, usefulness and timeliness of data to those who need it.

 

2.      Persistent surveillance and reconnaissance air platforms with high-fidelity sensors will complement the less flexible space-based assets used by the Air Force and other national security agencies.

 

3.      The development and implementation of integrated, adaptive command and control systems which will fully exploit the latent synergy within the network and the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (or ISR) regime. We believe that enhanced command and control, leveraging from the improved situational awareness provided by networking and ISR systems will lead to decision superiority – a war winning factor.

 

4.      The induction of new operational systems that offer generational improvements over the current platforms and are truly fifth generation, multi-mission capable assets.

 

Decision superiority – the capability to make better decisions and enable our desired operational tempo while denying the same to the adversary – will be delivered through centralised command and decentralised execution. The Air Force will leverage from the strengths inherent in our air power – persistence, perspective, reach, penetration, responsiveness and versatility – to deliver the right effects through precise control.

 

We view all individual projects, delivered through the Defence Capability Plan, as nodes within a larger networked system. The RAAF Air Operations Centre which is operational and which has been rigorously tested in joint exercises and deployed locations, forms the hub of all air activities.  It is therefore pivotal to the success of our air operations.  The Air Operations Centre gathers and fuses the data and generates the knowledge to implement (often in real-time) plans which provide the Air Force with the necessary combat edge.

 

The AOC networks a number of smaller nodes and is itself a larger node in the central ADF system. The new ADF operational headquarters being built near Bungendore in the ACT will deliver a functional Air Operations Centre.  

 

Air Force capabilities will be significant contributors to all key elements of the network centric warfare concept with the Air Operations Centre forming a part of the integrated command and control grid.  All air power assets will contribute to the sensor grid through the dissemination of information gathered in surveillance and reconnaissance, while air power’s offensive capabilities will form crucial components of the engagement grid. The information network will be supported by elements of the Air Force on a continuous basis and the Air Force contribution to network centric warfare concepts will be a major factor in transforming the ADF into a seamless force.

 

The new capabilities being acquired by the RAAF into the future will be employed in a holistically networked manner to create the necessary effects. We are well on our way to becoming a force that focuses on the desired effects and moving away from a single focus on kinetics.

 

 

NEW AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY

 

Australia’s current fleet of F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft have provided excellent service and will continue to do so. 

 

But against the increasingly sophisticated threats of the future, there comes a point when they no longer provide the capability edge we need. 

 

In order to ensure we maintain superiority and that there is no gap in our air combat capability with the planned withdrawal of the F-111, the Government has recently announced that the acquisition of 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet multi-role aircraft.  With the Super Hornets, Australia is assured of maintaining its combat edge over the next decade during the transition to the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

 

The Super Hornet is an extremely capable aircraft, having gone through a more extensive evolution than any other combat aircraft and having proved itself in battle.  It has excellent survivability, with well advanced stealth technologies incorporated into its design, a state of art active electronically scanned multi-role radar (in fact, the same radar as JSF will have), as well as state-of-the-art networking and supporting system architectures.

 

With its air superiority abilities, its land and maritime strike, weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Munition and Joint Standoff Weapon, and its ability to self-escort, the aircraft is ideally placed to support Australia’s medium term air combat needs.

 

The acquisition of the Super Hornets is a relatively low risk option, with the aircraft already operational with the US Navy and requiring minimum training for our air and ground crews.

 

The acquisition of Super Hornets provides Australia with an excellent capability, in a way that de-risks the transition from the current air combat force into the future JSF force.  The acquisition of the Joint Strike Fighter does come with some risks, but in our pursuit of cutting edge capability, we cannot be afraid to take calculated risks.  And there has been a considerable amount of calculation.

 

Commencing in 1998, Defence conducted a very broad analysis of the full range of options available to replace our fleets of F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft.

 

This investigation included engagement with the full range of aircraft manufacturers and engagement with the public to seek their views on what was required for the future.

 

This analysis identified the clear benefits offered by the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), in terms of capability and cost.  

 

Based on these clear advantages, in October 2002 Australia joined the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Denmark and Norway as a partner in the System Development and Demonstration phase of the JSF Program – the world’s largest aerospace program, with a development budget of over US$45 billion and an acquisition budget for the US Services alone of over US$250 billion.

 

No sooner had we joined this program, than critics came out of the woodwork.  Specifically, there were media criticisms that the JSF was just a “paper aeroplane”.  These criticisms aren’t really heard now, since:

 

·        The first aircraft is flying and performing well.

 

·        The next 11 test aircraft are being built.

 

·        Construction of the first production aircraft will soon commence.

 

Beyond the doubts surrounding the development of a developmental aircraft, there is then the debate about the relative merits of the F-35 JSF and the F-22 Raptor.

 

These are the only two fifth generation fighters.  They are referred to as “fifth generation” because they are clearly a generation ahead of all other aircraft in service today or likely to enter service in the near future.

 

They are the only two combat aircraft that are designed from the ground up to have very high levels of stealth, advanced networking and advanced sensors. Importantly, all these individual capabilities are tightly integrated to provide a huge edge over earlier generation aircraft.

 

It is true to say that the Joint Strike Fighter does not have some of the aerodynamic advantages of the F-22.  However, it has benefited from ten years worth of technological developments and lessons learnt in developing the F-22 (many of the same people working on the JSF had helped developed the F-22).

 

The benefits of this additional 10 years are clear as the JSF commences its flight test program. The aircraft has shown unprecedented build quality compared with all previous combat aircraft and unprecedented maturity in its first flights.

 

The other major benefits of the JSF include:

 

·        Its ability to carry a wider range of weapons, both internally and externally.

 

·        Its ability to carry larger weapons.

 

·        Its significantly larger array of sensors, including electro-optic sensors for targeting and situation awareness

 

·        Advanced displays that provide the pilot with unprecedented situation awareness.

 

There is absolutely no doubt that the F-22 Raptor is an outstanding air combat aircraft.  But because it was optimised for the air-to-air role, it cannot carry out the full range of roles required by Australia. 

 

To adopt a cricket analogy, investing in the F-22 Raptor would be like selecting an outstanding fast-bowler, when the team needs a great all-rounder.  

 

(Or for the benefit of our international guests, it would be like selecting a basket-ball player who dominates the boards, when the team requires someone who’s a bit more versatile and who can land shots from a distance). 

 

And the F-22 Raptor comes at an extremely high price. Even the US Air Force can only afford around 180 of these aircraft, whereas they plan to acquire ten times as many JSF.

 

So even if the F-22 were available for export (which it is not), it is not the right aircraft for Australia.

 

The Government’s decision in 2002 to enter the development phase of the JSF project has provided an unprecedented opportunity for our country to take part in the development of a combat aircraft Program, with all the associated benefits for Australian technology and innovation.

 

Participation in the JSF development has also opened up significant opportunities for Australian industry. To date, 32 Australian companies have won over US$100 million dollars worth of work in the development phase. Just one Melbourne company has had 200 highly skilled engineers employed on the Program.

 

Good progress on the Development phase resulted in the Government deciding, in November 2006, to enter into the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development phase, covering the remaining life of the JSF Program.

 

Partnership in this phase has opened up billions of dollars of opportunities for Australian industry.

 

Defence is also working with Australian universities and research organisations which have, to date, identified over 150 Australian-developed technologies that may provide future enhancements to the JSF.

 

I made it clear before joining this phase that Australia needed a guarantee from the US that we would have assured access to the technology and data we need to operate and support the JSF to meet our sovereign defence requirements.  We received those guarantees prior to joining the next phase.

 

The JSF is likely to face technical, cost and schedule challenges.  But I am confident that it will mature to provide the capability Australia needs.

 

 

FURTHER AIR FORCE ACQUISITIONS

 

The transition to the JSF will coincide (and indeed drive) the transition toward the fully networked Australian Defence Force. 

 

The Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft, along with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) and our ground based GCI radar and civil ATC radar feeds will give us a credible surveillance and reconnaissance capability to form a Recognised Air and Surface Picture. The combination of AEW&C and the high altitude long endurance UAVs will provide data that will be directly linked to our Eastern Regions Operating Centre (EASTROC) facility which will be the hub of Air Force battlespace awareness and control capability.

 

Maritime patrol and response is another capability that encompasses both surveillance and reconnaissance as well as response options. The current fleet of P-3 Orions will need to be replaced or refurbished in the next decade and the induction of a new or upgraded multi-mission aircraft will provide enhanced capabilities in both surveillance and response.

 

To make the most of our future combat platforms we need to have sufficient air-to-air refuelling assets. We are acquiring five KC-30B MRTT aircraft for this purpose.

 

In order to ensure adequate expeditionary capability we need sufficient air mobility to provide crucial combat support.  We are developing an appropriate roadmap for the future that balances our airlift needs, spanning light tactical airlift (currently provided by the Caribou), medium lift (currently the C130s) and heavy, strategic airlift (with our new C17s).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

With the RAAF scheduled to introduce replacements for almost all of its current air platforms over the next decade, these are challenging and exciting times. 

 

We will undoubtedly see more interesting media headlines.  But we must keep our vision fixed on the future. 

 

The future RAAF will be modest in size by world standards.  But the steps we take now will help ensure we have the technology, flexibility, synergy and firepower to lay the foundation for our future security.  And you are the people who make it happen. 

 

I would like to wish all of you an interesting, productive (and fun) week and the very best for the future.  And on behalf of the Australian Government I would like to thank you for everything you do to enhance the security of Australia and also, of our world. 

 

Thank you.