From the perspective of the Australian Government it’s been extremely successful in a number of different aspects. The first is that it’s a demonstration that when countries that have a joint interest in addressing the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and want to take up the option of seeking to interfere with a transfer of such weapons or their precursors by ship, it shows that they can actually do the job in practice. Today we’ve seen an operation mounted by Australians, Japanese, the United States and the French with the support of observers from a number of the other countries, actually do the job very competently and that will give them confidence to go on to further exercises that are planned to take place in the next few months around the world. Of course you never know in advance when such a need might occur. Secondly, I think it’s been a great success in sending a message to those who may be interested in the transfer of weapons of mass destruction or their precursors that there are many countries in the world that regard this issue so seriously that they’re prepared to make the effort that’s been evidenced today to be able to deter or defeat such a transfer if that was a choice they decided to make. A lot of work has obviously gone into it, this is the first of these exercises globally. I’ve just got to dwell for a moment on the sort of complexity of putting it together from the perspective of operations and law and logistics and the like. It’s been a big effort in a short period of time and does seem to be remarkably successful. I’d like to take the opportunity to thank all those who have made it possible within the armed forces, not only in Australia but the other partner countries in this exercise and also all the many back up people who won’t be so evident within Governments and other supporting agencies who have helped make it possible as well.

It’s very unfortunate in many ways that countries need to come together to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this way, but the issue is so serious that every effort must be made to deter and defeat a possible transfer of such weapons and after this series of exercises those countries that wish to do so should be in better position to be able to effectively take such action.

What sort of a message does this exercise send to North Korea specifically?

Well I don’t necessarily want to distinguish any country. It sends a message to all of those who may for one reason or another contemplate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction or their precursors, but there is a committed global movement across the world that is going to make every effort to stop them. And really the interdiction program is to work out how that could occur within international law, to settle the rules – there’s a team working on that, how we can communicate and share intelligence more effectively – there’s another team working on that. Obviously there are teams in operations as we’ve seen today working on how you would do it in practice if the need should arise.

You’ve gone to great lengths to make this very public, a lot of coverage, why have you gone down that path?

I think it came out of the last meeting which was the one in France where how this exercise would be promoted was settled, but basically it’s to send a message that the 11 countries that are committed to advancing this potential way of defeating or deterring the transfer of nuclear weapons really are serious about the issue. We of course want to engage other countries, a lot of important players who are not yet part of this movement and we want them to be part of it, and there have been efforts made to communicate with them before today’s exercise and that will be on going. Because it is important to absolutely minimise the number of countries that might contemplate the transfer of nuclear weapons.

In geopolitical terms, especially when you consider some of the concern that was expressed (inaudible) in north Asia, how important is it to have the Japanese coastguard vessel here, two helicopters and a whole bunch of other personnel involved here so openly and so centrally in this exercise?

I think that’s been very important and I congratulate the Japanese Government on their commitment. Captain Jones can talk about it, but they’ve obviously put a great deal of effort into their operational contribution. The challenges within the Japanese legal system to be able to do this, they are obviously wrestling with those challenges very effectively. And they put on a very competent show I thought today. It was the Japanese that were leaving the helicopters and going down the ropes and they did a very good job.

The SPI (sic) hasn’t been regarded in Tokyo without some concern has it?

Well in Japanese terms any engagement with a military component outside of what might have been narrowly defined as self defence is questioned. But we’ve seen a number of instances now where the law has been changed and Japanese forces are contributing very usefully to operations around the world. We are pleased that they were with us in East Timor, we had the Japanese engineers in East Timor. They helped offshore in the War Against Terrorism, and here they are now engaging in another global movement to seek to deter the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and I think it’s a good thing to see.

(inaudible) If this is legal, however in actual interception when it actually happens how are they going to overcome the problem of legality ?

Well as I said there are a lot of complex legal issues and there is now a team engaged from across the 11 countries working on those legal issues. We’ve always said that what we are seeking to do is defeat an illegal tranfer so the operation has got to be within the law and reaching a consensus between the 11 countries on the principals of law is not an easy task. But it will be achieved because the 11 countries are so determined to effectively defeat this threat.

Has Australia got any way of overcoming this issue (inaudible)?

Well it depends on the circumstances of the particular interdiction. If it’s in Australian waters then for us it’s a relatively simple legal exercise. In international waters it becomes more complex. You get into issues as to whether the ship is flagged and the like. But it’s for the international lawyers to determine what would be the set of rules that each of the states is prepared to accept. Efforts are being made in that regard at the moment.

This was a Japanese flagged suspect vessel and a Japanese Coastguard so even in international waters I’m told that some of those issues were dealt with. What would happen if it was a North Korean flagged suspect vessel and the North Koreans we’re interested in intercepting?

Well you see I don’t think that it’s helpful for me to be dragged into the hypothetical in that way. What I’ve said to you is the legal issues are being debated by the 11 countries that are the partner countries in the initiative and we expect a set of legal rules to be agreed by those who have been participating. So if we ever get to the situation of a real operation it’ll be carried out by parties that concur in the legal interpretation of what they’re doing.

Do you think we will be a new UN resolution or a Security Council resolution in the end to back up this strategic proliferation initiative?

I don’t know. In some ways it would assist. In so many ways the UN Security Council resolutions assist and it helps in the evolution of international law in these complex areas but we’ve got to work in the real world and if there is not a resolution we’ve still got to face the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Are there other countries who are willing to join this (inaudible)?

I don’t think it’s got to that stage. I don’t think there was an invitation list. The idea is for the 11 countries…it’s a complex challenge in a number of ways. 11 countries can settle rules and operational principals and so forth and show that it can work you then look to see how it can be extended. In the mean time what we have is a program of engagement of other countries that are interested in what we are doing to ensure they are well informed, to give them the opportunity to observe if they wish and that will make it easier ultimately to expand the group.

And you are confident about that? (inaudible)

Am I confident that they will reach agreement on a set of rules? Yes I am. The meetings are ongoing. Every meeting seems to exhibit greater confidence than the previous meeting. The fact that this exercise has taken place so early in the whole process. The fact that further exercises are planned. What I read is that other aspects, the intelligence side for example is progressing well. The increased sharing of intelligence, so without sharing intelligence you won’t find the target and the targets are not easy to find in these particular types of challenges. So yes I think that all the signs are very positive in that regard.

Are you aware of any international reaction to the exercise so far, for example from North Korea or even from Beijing.

Beijing… are you talking about post exercise or before exercise?

Well I was going to ask you next how Paul O’Sullivan went up there.

Well today is the day of the exercise. I’ve obviously heard nothing since then. We’re certainly very interested in engaging China because China can play a critical role in effectively addressing a threat that might arise from transfer of weapons of mass destruction in this region of the world. But there are others who would be just as enthused about engaging other countries in other parts of the world. This is a global issue and if we’re going to effectively defeat the threat the more countries and key players that we can have involved in the end the better.

What was the significance, and if you have any idea, what was the feedback on Mr O’Sullivan’s visit to Beijing?

I don’t think that… well I’ve read the cables but I don’t think that that’s appropriate for me, I think that it’s not my portfolio. But we’re very keen on positively engaging China within the process. That’s why not only us but others have been explaining to China what this is really all about and it’s as much protecting China’s interests as it is the interests of any other country.

What’s Australia’s official position regarding potential interdiction of North Korean vessels. Is it strongly supported as a potential of action, or more cautious? How would you rate it?

Well the technical answer at the moment is that we and the other ten countries are still engaged in a process. We haven’t actually made operational decisions from that process. We’re settling the issues of international law, we’re settling whether in practice interdictions can be effectively carried out. We’re seeing if we’re prepared to share the intelligence necessary to enable it to work. And out of that some time in the future there are obviously going to be operational decisions that will have to be made between governments. So I think you’re stepping two ahead of where we as a group of 11 nations are at the moment. But it would certainly be fair for you to conclude by the effort that’s been put into this particular exercise that all 11 countries are very serious in seeking to address the issue.

Given you keenness to participate, how risky was mounting this exercise?

I don’t think there’s any risk. Eleven countries as I said are interested in progressing the issue and you’ve got to address the operational issues just as much as the medical or intelligence or any other issues. But it’s important that we make every effort to ensure that all countries, particularly potential key players in the future, understand what this is all about and this is another way in which we can deter or defeat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and we all have an interest in that.

A lot of analysts believe that most of the missile proliferation from North Korea, just as an example, is not conducted by sea but conducted by air and by rail. Are there exercises planned, are the working groups discussing ways of dealing interception of shipments by those two means?

By air yes, what was the other?

By rail.

By land, I don’t know by land. I know that planning is in its early stages for exercises for transported by air. Maybe next year.

Can you tell us about the next exercise that’s been mooted?

I don’t know that the times and places have been announced, but expect exercises in Europe and perhaps in the Mediterranean. The focus then will be on the other of the 11 participants. We’re very pleased to have observers from Germany and France. France also had an aircraft involved today but they no doubt will be taking a lead in the operations in Europe and so it will work around the world. It’s very important that this is a global movement. The fact that we’ve been able to facilitate and lead in the first exercise within the western Pacific is a good thing, but it’s got to be expanded beyond the western Pacific.

Question to Captain Peter Jones, what did the smugglers throw over board and what did you find?

There were two boxes which the vessel threw over board. We then used the Coastwatch aircraft that went around and was able to identify where those boxes were. Australian Customs vessel Botany Bay intercepted, identified what they were and we took things from there.

For the purpose of the exercise was it industrial chemicals or fuel rods?

In fact they were just empty boxes just to test the capability of quickly reacting to something being thrown over board. On the ship itself, they did have boxes to simulate chemical agents so specialist teams could go and do their training and also to importantly see how their training between different countries differed or were the same. So they got benefits through those fairly detailed searches.

Captain you yourself have been involved in many boardings in the past and the Australian Navy have I suppose done thousands, what did you learn from this exercise – in particular I guess the general issue of interoperability?

I think the issue today was, first off from our perspective, we had never operated with a Japanese Coastguard before and we were very impressed with how they do business. Very professional and very confident, they intergrated quite well, certainly in the procedures that ourselves, the French and the US have developed over many years. That was very good. But the other thing here was a very specialised boarding taking place looking for chemical weapons and bringing along expert teams to do an examination.

Any hiccups?

I think the thing we’ve learned today is the way people deploy their forces. There are some subtle differences in how they do that, communications between the different forces, different procedures, different force procedures that are used. And that is something that we will bring together and put in a report that all the PSI countries can draw on and then hopefully the next exercise will go that much better.

Overall how did it go?

We were very pleased actually. We were expecting a lot more hiccups but it went very smoothly and as I said I was very impressed with how the Japanese did the initial boarding and the Coastguard are really quite expert in terms of doing detailed examinations and they went through the process quite expeditiously.

In terms of taking over the boat did you run into any trouble?

No (inaudible) very much for this exercise it was very much procedural, the emphasis really on making sure that everyone could inter-operate and the fact that we could do it in a safe and professional manner. And no doubt when the exercises as they go on will be much more complex and may bring in some of those parts of play as well.

Minister one last question. Australia has played one of the major roles of this PSI exercise. Why is Australia so serious about PSI ?

Well we’re so serious about threats associated with weapons of mass destruction, that’s the driving influence. Beyond that we’ve also had a lot of experience in recent years on operational matters in relation to interdiction and Captain Jones was a former tactical commander in the northern force in the Persian Gulf. He has had to work in interoperability questions before. We do have within the Australian Defence Force specialists with that sort of background and we utilise that in terms of our global protection.

(Inaudible) drug smuggling?

The ship that was in Australian waters, well that interdiction was highly successful as well. A very difficult interdiction in terms of the sea state and other issues. So I guess from Australia’s perspective we have shown that we have those technical capabilities within our own waters but it is much more challenging when you’re dealing with a group nations. But the answer to all threats associated with weapons of mass destruction has to be cooperation and practical approaches across the world. So you can’t just practise these things in isolation, you’ve got to bring the international community together on it and that’s what today’s been all about.

I’ve got one more question as well, I’m sorry. Minister Navy Commanders calibrate the risks that their prepared to take to the threat that they believe is being posed by the … they wouldn’t for example risk the lives or their crew if someone was smuggling fruit. If there’s good intelligence that someone’s smuggling weapons of mass destruction is it worth risking the lives of Australian seaman and others for it?

Well I can’t think of any greater threat to Australian or other interests than threats that are associated with weapons of mass destruction. We’ve tried for years to deter the proliferation of WMDs through the international conventions and in other ways. We do have a real concern, and other countries obviously share with us that we may well face a situation in the years ahead where we do get actual transfers, sale and (inaudible) of these weapons as a result to some extent of the previous regime not being totally successful. Anyway that’ s the past. The issue is we’ve got to confront potential threats in these areas effectively in the future and that’ s worth training for..

ENDS