The Hon. Joel Fitzgibbon MP,
Minister for Defence

View this file as a printer friendly Microsoft Word document Printer friendly version 30 Jul 2008
MIN80730/08
When, in December 2006, Kevin Rudd invited me to be Federal Labor’s Defence spokesman, I had an immediate sense of what I wanted to achieve in this critical area of responsibility


THE HON JOEL FITZGIBBON MP

Minister for Defence

 

 

Speech to the National Press Club of Australia

Wednesday 30 July 2008

 

Check against delivery

 

E&EO………………………………………………………………………..

 

Labor’s Defence Reform Project - Meeting the Strategic Challenges of the 21st Century

 

 

When, in December 2006, Kevin Rudd invited me to be Federal Labor’s Defence spokesman, I had an immediate sense of what I wanted to achieve in this critical area of responsibility.

 

First, I wanted to ensure that Australia was well placed to meet the strategic challenges of the 21st Century.

 

Second, I was determined to ensure that defence and national security did not prove to be the electoral albatross for the new Labor team it had sometimes proven to be in the past.

 

Too many Australians were depending on a Labor win – hoping for new directions in health, education, infrastructure and workplace relations.

 

 

Indeed, I wanted to re-establish Labor as the “natural” Defence party.  After all we have a proud heritage including:

 

  • Andrew Fisher’s Defence reforms which in part delivered him the 1914 election – most remembered for his  - “to the last man and the last shilling” speech.

 

  • John Curtin’s strong leadership in the darkest days of the Second World War.

 

  • Of course, Labor gave birth to the US Alliance – our most important Defence relationship.

 

  • And in my experience, military historians and strategic thinkers more often than not, nominate Beazley and Ray as the best Defence Ministers of the modern era.

 

 

I knew instinctively that putting Labor on track to achieving these goals would require me to initially at least, do not much more than pursue intelligent, sound defence policy.  Including a commitment to;

 

  • the US Alliance and all the reciprocal expectations which go with it;

 

  • an increase in our investment in Defence, not a decrease;

 

  • decision making based on the national interest rather than sectional interests;

 

  • a deliberate and cautious approach to where and when overseas operations are justified; and,

 

  • Support for our men and women in uniform, surely amongst our most respected Australians.  Certainly, somewhat higher in the pecking order than politicians!

 

It all seemed pretty simple really, and in many respects it has been.

 

Of course, our political opponents ran a bit of interference along the way. 

 

Some of it was quite overt – like the resolutions and Dorothy Dixers in the House designed to imply Labor was not a party truly committed to the US Alliance.  Or we were a Party susceptible to a “cut and run” approach when the going gets tough.

 

 

Other attacks from the then Government were more covert.  Like constant and strategically placed rumours of Labor’s hidden plans to cut expenditure, cancel planned capability projects, sell operational Defence land, reduce Defence housing support, reduce the deployment allowance, abolish the cadets, and cancel the two proposed Army battalions.

 

 

Most days, I seemed to spend more time putting out Tory-lit bush fires than on any more productive endeavours.  My numerous base visits, media interviews, speeches, and opinion pieces were by necessity, partly about neutralising the impacts of the rumour mill of the “born-to-rule”.

 

But just holding our ground against a tough, ruthless and experienced Government was never going to be enough.  A counter-insurgency campaign would be important as well. 

 

Hitting the Coalition’s national security and management credentials.  Highlighting for example;

 

  • Their capability cost blow-outs and overruns;

 

  • Their stubbornness on Iraq which took them to some inevitably illogical positions; and,

 

  • Their failure to demonstrate that force structure and capability planning remained a function of well thought out assessments of our strategic outlook.

 

Meanwhile we made key and firm election commitments to

 

  • a new Defence White Paper;

 

  • growth in Defence expenditure;

 

  • an air combat capability review: and,

 

  • an independent review of the Defence Budget.

 

All of which and more, we’ve delivered or are in the process of delivering.

 

Today I can announce that Mr George Pappas will conduct the Defence Budget audit.  Many of you will know George.  He  is a former Senior Vice President of Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and has more than 30 years international experience in management consulting. 

His independent audit will be a key tool in our efforts to put the dysfunctional Defence Budget we’ve inherited back on track.

 

The White Paper will go beyond the promise of re-connecting strategic assessments with force structure and capability planning.  Its companion reviews will reassess

 

  • The size and composition of our civilian workforce;

  • Force disposition

 

  • The supply and sustainment of deployed ADF elements;

 

  • Defence’s information technology needs; and,

 

  • The requirements of our defence industry, and science and technology more generally.

 

In implementing all these initiatives and more, I’m fortunate to have a great team behind me.  Warren Snowdon, Mike Kelly and Greg Combet, are all making real and meaningful contributions to the Defence reform project.

 

Along with our budget review and savings initiatives, no corner of Defence will escape the microscope of our drive for greater efficiencies and effectiveness.

 

Defence will need three per cent real growth in funding and our re-invested savings over the course of the next decade to do all the things we’ll need to do in the increasingly uncertain strategic environment we face.

 

Making the challenge more difficult are the enormous Defence Budget black holes we’ve inherited – big shortfalls in the provision of money for capability sustainment costs and wage increases. 

 

And of course, big capability mistakes like the Seasprite helicopter and many others, which not only take up more than enough of my time, but provide Greg Combet with just about a full-time job on their own.

 

These inherited problems help to explain why I’ve set myself the goal of finding savings totalling $1 billion every year for the next ten years.  Ten billion dollars which will be re-invested in higher defence priorities. 

 

Not only will we spend more money on Defence each year than at any time in the history of the Federation, we will spend it more effectively and efficiently.

 

I’m determined that every dollar spent in Defence will be a dollar well spent.  Our national security demands no less!  And our troops demand no less. 

 

I want to ensure that they have all the capability, training and protection they need to do their job as effectively, efficiently and as safely as is possible.

 

And we’re determined to avoid the capability mistakes of the previous Government.  While working to repair the nightmare projects we’ve inherited, we are also reviewing defence procurement and Greg and I have engaged the highly regarded and experienced David Mortimer to head the project.

 

Our three new Service Chiefs have been charged with making our people and recruitment challenges a top priority.  There is no doubt that our people and skills shortages are the biggest challenge the ADF faces in the coming years. 

 

That’s why Warren and I have been so focused on raising the participation rates of women, indigenous Australians and those from non-English speaking backgrounds.  We are determined to maintain our steady progress in increasing the participation rates of these Australians.

 

Amongst many other things including the development of the Asia Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation, Mike Kelly is busy reviewing the Cadets, a key driver for recruitment success.

 

But our single biggest project remains the Defence White Paper.  Attempting to predict our strategic environment twenty years ahead is a tough task.  So too will be answering questions like:

 

  • What is the likely role of force in the future international system? 

 

  • What is that system going to look like in, say, 2030 - when a number of emerging major powers will have attained considerably more economic, strategic and raw military power than they currently have today, or have had in the past?

 

  • What will the emerging multi-polar world look like?

 

  • Will the era of major state-on-state conflict in the international system have largely come to an end, superseded by an era of intra-state strife and conflict as well as threats from so-called non-state actors, such as terrorists and insurgent groups?

 

  • What risks and threats will we face in the emerging strategic environment?

 

  • Will changes in the planet's climate and environment create new sources of tension and conflict? 

 

  • What role should our armed forces - which are largely trained and geared for war - play in the future, as distinct from civilian agencies?

 

The White Paper development process is well underway. The CDF, Secretary Nick Warner, Mike Pezzullo and his team, and indeed my Ministerial Advisory Panel have been working overtime in helping the Government shape the Paper’s direction.

 

Also busy is my White Paper Consultation team led by Stephen Loosely.  They’ve been traveling the length and breadth of the country providing all Australians with an opportunity to learn more about the process and, if it is their desire, make their own contribution to the discussion.    

 

The White Paper is an overdue initiative.  The inexplicable failure of the former Government to review our strategic outlook had caused drift, and a disconnect between strategic guidance and force structure planning.

 

Worse, I strongly suspect that this suited the former Prime Minister.  It allowed him to operate on political instinct without the inconvenience of any accepted framework which might spoil his political agenda.

 

The White Paper from which John Howard and Brendan Nelson were working was developed in the late 1990s and released in the year 2000.

The world has changed so much since then.

  • September 11, and subsequent terror events in Bali, Jakarta, London and Madrid;
  • The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan;
  • The emerging risk of WMD landing in the hands of non-state actors;
  • Advances in space and cyber-warfare technologies;
  • The threat of nuclear capability in the hands of states of concern like Iran; and,
  • Huge shifts in the global distribution of power including the rise and rise of China and the emergence of India.

 

The new White Paper will take these developments into account and deliver options to help Government make fully-informed and cost-effective decisions about the military capabilities we need to defend Australia and its interests out to 2030.

It will align defence strategic guidance, force structure and capability priorities, and resource strategies by taking the most comprehensive view yet of the Defence enterprise.

 

The White Paper will incorporate a thorough Force Structure Review, drawing on a range of policy and strategic analysis to assess the force structure and capabilities Australia needs out to 2030.

 

The review will identify likely tasks for the ADF, determine the joint capabilities needed to undertake these tasks and develop appropriate force structure and capability options to deliver these joint capabilities.

 

The Force Structure Review will develop options for Government for a capable sustainable joint force which leverages the whole Defence establishment.

 

While today I have no intention of pre-empting the outcomes of the White Paper, there are some questions we can answer with a degree of certainty.

 

First, Australia’s top priority will remain the ability to defend our continent and our immediate area of strategic interests, without relying on the assistance of others.

 

 

Second, it will be necessary to maintain a capacity to take a lead role in stabilisation efforts in our immediate region.

 

Third, we will also need to maintain the capacity to join in coalition efforts in the broader Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

 

This calls for a balanced force and will pose some difficult capability and force structure decisions given our relative size and limited budget.

 

The Asia-Pacific represents both challenges and opportunities for Australia as well as our principal ally the United States. 

 

The region is home to two of the most important powers of the next fifty years - China and India.  Their unquenchable thirst for our commodities including oil, gas and iron ore has provided Australia with a long period of sustained economic growth.

 

But in the coming decades their economic growth and military capability will shape both the region and the globe.

 

 

Managing this gradual shift in global economic and strategic power to the Asia-Pacific will be the great challenge of the first half of this century.  That is why Prime Minister Rudd has begun the discussion about the future of our regional architecture – one which unlike any existing forum, includes all the relevant major players – Australia, the US, China, India and Japan.

 

Regional dialogue which nurtures confidence and trust in one another will be critical in managing changes in the power balance both within and outside the region.

 

And as we attempt to look out thirty years and beyond, miscalculation in the Taiwan Straits or on the Korean Peninsula may not be the only potential threats.

 

As the region continues to grow, we could face energy resource challenges as nation-states seek to meet the needs and expectations of their people.

 

Water may become more precious as population growth and pollution puts pressure on fresh water supplies.

 

Climate change could force large migrations of people.

 

And of course the threat posed by extreme Islamism, remains a real one.

 

That takes me to our biggest immediate challenge – the war in Afghanistan.

Last time I attended a National Press Club address it was to listen to my UK counterpart and friend, the Rt. Hon. Des Brown.  I’m confident those of you who were here will agree it was a good and passionate speech.

 

Certainly, Afghanistan is an important project for Australia.

 

That’s why I found my early engagement with NATO so frustrating.

 

The lack of a coherent all-of-country, whole-of-government strategy shocked me.

 

So too did the underwhelming performance of some of our European partners.

 

So too did the disjointed nature of the chain of command.

 

But what shocked me most of all, was the extent to which Australia had been excluded from the planning processes.  Our troops - their expertise, and their sacrifices were welcome but our strategic input was not.

 

Our Government was being asked to make assessments about the mission’s risks and the likelihood of success without access to the strategic plan.

 

I’m pleased to say this is no longer the case and will never again be the case while ever I’m in a position to influence events.

 

Nor will I allow Australia’s contribution to overseas deployments to be taken for granted.  Australia’s contribution in Afghanistan is a significant one. 

 

We are the largest non-NATO contributor and the ninth largest contributor overall. 

 

Our loss of life has thankfully been small when compared to the losses of some other partners but six Australian lives is six lives too many, and they must be remembered by our partners as we remember the sacrifices made by them.

 

So how is the war in Afghanistan going?

 

“Frustratingly slowly”, is the short and candid answer.

 

You may have noticed I never talk about ‘winning” in Afghanistan.

 

You “win” or “lose” state on state conflicts.  You “win” or “lose” civil wars.

 

But you do not “win” or “lose” counter-insurgency campaigns.

 

I liked the way Secretary Gates put it while I was in Washington two weeks ago.  He said – “we will not kill and capture our way to victory” in Afghanistan.

 

You meet with success in campaigns like that being waged in Afghanistan when you’ve convinced the overwhelming majority that life under the democratic and economic model we are offering is better than that being promoted by the insurgents.

 

Success comes in campaigns like Afghanistan when, but for the most radical – that is those pursuing an extreme minority view - everyone is benefiting from a stable society that is moving forward to relative prosperity.

 

I came home from Washington two weeks ago feeling a little more optimistic about the prospects of winning the commitment of ordinary Afghans than I was when I left Australia: of broadening and deepening popular support for our objectives.

 

During the few days I spent in the US Capital I was reassured that the current administration remains not only committed to the project, but determined to do more.

 

I also watched on as both Barrack Obama and John McCain committed themselves to doing much more in terms of troop numbers. 

So we can now be sure that whoever wins in November, we can expect greater troop numbers from the United States.

 

I would have of course preferred the burden to be spread far more evenly across NATO, something I will continue to push with our NATO partners, but for now it seems it is simply not to be.

 

My second grounds for greater optimism is an emerging recognition that we not only need to do more to up the pace of our training of the Afghan National Army, we also may need a bigger Afghan Army than that envisaged at the Bucharest Summit.

 

This will, of course, require more money and lots of it.  Maybe the burden of that expense should fall to those NATO nations not prepared to do more on the military front. If they are not able to send more troops maybe they could send more funds to allow for the further development of Afghan Security forces.

 

The third source of optimism came from the briefings I received on the work of the U.N.’s Special Envoy Kai Eidie. 

 

I’m advised his early approach has been innovative and creative and my interlocutors confirmed that he will spread his presence and influence beyond Kabul and into the outer provinces – including Oruzgan.

 

The fourth source of optimism came from proposals to unify the chain of command, hitherto divided between those operating under the International Security Assistance Force and those fighting as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

 

The fifth source of optimism came from what I would describe as a new and deeper recognition that success will not come in Afghanistan without a much greater effort in Pakistan.

 

The international community cannot sit back and allow Pakistan to become the new breeding ground for Al Qa’eda and JI.  It appears likely that as the surge meets with success in Baghdad, the Jihadists are making their way to the tribal areas of Pakistan’s North West.

 

From there they can make their way through the porous border to Afghanistan with relative ease.

 

The largely lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas are home to around three and a half million people.  Amazingly, just three percent of them live in established townships.  Among them mix countless Afghan refugees. 

 

The neighbouring North West Frontier Province houses the equivalent of Australia’s population.  The majority of them are Pashtuns.

 

The FATA also provides a trade route which takes Afghanistan’s drugs to world market to fund the insurgency in Afghanistan and the global terror it spawns.

 

The international community must act on these issues in Pakistan with new urgency.  Economic aid to the FATA will need to increase substantially.  Education levels must rise, economic and social infrastructure must be established with urgency.

 

Diplomatic efforts must focus on securing an agreed settlement by Afghanistan and Pakistan over the disputed Durand line – the border imposed last century by the previous colonial administration - a border which physically divides the Pashtun people.

 

And we must arm the Pakistani Army with the skills and means to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns and civil operations.  It’s not as if the Pakistani’s haven’t already invested heavily in the stabilisation of the tribal areas, with more than 1,400 of their military dead and many more injured.

 

Now I’m not suggesting for a moment that these things are easy, they are not.

 

But the cost of not trying is too high to contemplate – failure in Afghanistan, humanitarian disaster in the FATA and a boost for Islamic extremists including those who perpetrate acts of terror under the names Al Qa’eda and JI.

 

Australia has done great work in Afghanistan.  We are expanding our influence, clearing the insurgents, and building schools, hospitals, roads and bridges.  

 

Again, our contribution there has not been without cost and the Australian Government will continue to do all it can to secure faster and greater success.

 

Just as we’re determined to ensure that all Australians can feel reassured that they, and their interests, are secured by both informed judgments about where the potential strategic threats to our nation are likely to emerge, and appropriate planning responses.

 

Along with our Budget, management and capability reforms, the coming White Paper, and its conclusions on force structure plans and our capability needs, should provide the Australian people with confidence in the ability of their Government to maintain our national security and to protect our interests.

 

That would be a Labor Government!  The Rudd Labor Government, in which I serve with pride.

 

I look forward to taking your questions.

 

 

View this file as a printer friendly Microsoft Word document Printer friendly version
Top
Receive media releases automatically via email. Register your address here